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In January 2006, Wendy Whitaker and her husband bought their first
home, an early 1900s bungalow on a quiet street in Harlem, Georgia, just
outside Augusta.' However, their excitement would be short-lived. One
month later, the police showed up at the Whitaker's front door and explained
that Wendy would have to move or face arrest.2 Her legal troubles were the
product of a poor decision she made as a teenager: in 1997, when Wendy
was a seventeen-year-old sophomore in high school, a fellow classmate
propositioned that she perform oral sex on him during a class movie
presentation. As the lights went dark, so did her future. They were caught,
and the embarrassment and expulsion from high school that followed were
the least of Wendy's problems. As the young man was just shy of his
sixteenth birthday and the legal age of consent, Wendy found herself faced
with sodomy5 charges under Georgia's harsh sex offender statutes.6
1. Scott Henry, Life in the Shadows, CREATIVE LOAFING, July 19, 2006,
http://atlanta.creativeloafing.com/gyrobase/life-inthe-shadows/Content?oid=98753.
2. Id Georgia's sex offender residency restriction prohibits individuals from residing "within
1,000 feet of any child care facility, church, school [includes designated school bus stops], or area
where minors congregate." GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b) (Supp. 2009); see infra Part IV.B and
notes 155-162 and accompanying text.
3. Henry, supra note 1. Generally, teenagers are not known for having the most sound
judgment or grasp of the legal consequences of their actions, and yet most teenagers can stumble
through adolescence so that they may as adults look back and marvel at their temporary period of
foolishness. Research suggests the reason teenagers engage in risky behaviors is that their brain
development is pre-mature to avoid this type of behavior. See Sharon Jayson, Expert: Risky Teen
Behavior is All in the Brain, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-04-04-teen-brainN.htm (explaining that teens are so
susceptible to peer pressure because the adolescent brain is not fully developed until after age
eighteen); see also Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives From Brain
and Behavioral Science, 16 ASS'N FOR PSYCHOL. Sci. 55-115 (Apr. 2007) (Steinberg, a Temple
University psychologist, explains that "[a]dolescents are at an age where they do not have full
capacity to control themselves.").
4. Whitaker says it never occurred to her that the boy being fifteen at the time could present
legal problems because he was a few months shy of the age of legal consent. Henry, supra note 1.
"Whitaker says, looking back at the incident[:] 'I'm not saying what I did wasn't wrong-it was-
but when you're a teenager, you do stupid things."' Id; see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5. "A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
6-2(a)(1) (2007). Violation of the statute carries a mandatory sentence of no less than one year and
not more than twenty years. Id. § 16-6-2(b)(1). Bizarrely enough, Georgia provides less extreme
penalties for sexual acts such as bestiality, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-6(b) (2007), and necrophilia, GA.
CODE. ANN. § 16-6-7(b) (2007), which provide one to five year and one to ten year sentences,
respectively.
6. Georgia has some of the harshest restrictions on sex offenders, along with Iowa and Maine.
See GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2009); Jerry Harkavy, Maine Supreme Court Takes Up Sex
Offender Registry, BOSTON.cOM, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/
2009/02/10/maine supreme court takesupsex_offender registry/ (discussing that Maine's
lifetime registration requirement applies retroactively regardless of the sexual offense); Wendy
Koch, Sex-Offender Residency Laws Get Second Look, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2007. available at
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Her court-appointed attorney, having met her only minutes before her
hearing, advised her to plead guilty.? As a result, she was sentenced to five
years probation, and, worst of all, she would be subject to Georgia's "one-
size-fits-all" sex offender registry scheme for the rest of her life.8
Furthermore, putting this experience behind her has proved to be more
difficult and complicated because of her sex offender status.9 People that
Wendy knows have found her name and picture on the registry and "her
neighbors ... have shunned her since being alerted by sheriffs deputies of
her conviction."'o Furthermore, if two methods of dissemination" were not
enough, Wendy's mug shot and map to her home were shown on local
television news during a segment which seeks to "keep tabs" on sex
offenders in the area.12
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-25-sex-offender-laws-cover x.htm (noting that
Georgia, along with Iowa, does not apply registration or residency requirements based on designated
classifications among sex offenders; rather, they are applied universally regardless of the "sex
crime" committed).
7. Henry, supra note 1. Wendy says it was not explained to her "that pleading guilty would
place her on the sex-offender registry." Id. There is no evidence to suggest that a guilty plea results
in a less severe sentence for a sex crime; in fact, it appears that sex offenders receive longer
sentences upon conviction. See, e.g., STATE OF WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMMISSION, SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING 1 (2004), available at http://www.sgc.wa.gov/PUBS/
SSOSAReport.pdf ("On average sex offenders serve longer terms in prison and jail than persons
convicted of other felony offenses. In fiscal year 2003, the average sentence length for all felonies
was 37.3 months, compared to 90.8 months for sex offenses.").
8. Henry, supra note 1. Georgia law requires all sex offenders who are subject to the registry to
stay registered with current information for the rest of the offender's life. GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-1 -
12(f)(7) (Supp. 2009). Failing to comply with the requirements results in imprisonment for no less
than ten and no more than thirty years. Id. § 42-1-12(n). A second violation of the registration
requirement results in life imprisonment. Id.
9. See § 42-1-12 (detailing the requirements for registered sex offenders in Georgia). A general
definition of "sex offender" is a person who has been criminally charged and convicted of a sex
crime. See WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilSexoffender (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (entry
for "Sex Offender"); DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sex%200ffender
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010). The official definition varies by jurisdiction and statute, and is the
subject of constant debate.
10. Henry, supra note 1. See § 42-1-12(i); infra note 12 and accompanying text.
I1. See § 42-1-12(f), (i) (referring to the registry and community notification requirements).
12. Henry, supra note 1. Wendy expressed her shame and continued humiliation when she said,
"I had to explain to people why I [was] on TV for something I did nine years ago." Id. According to
the Georgia sex offender statute, registry information is private and is to be used for only specific
"law enforcement" and government purposes. § 42-1-12(o). But the language of the statute is vague
and lacks safeguards to protect sex offenders from the misuse of information. Especially
problematic is the wide grant of discretion it bestows upon local authorities to "release such other
relevant information collected under this Code section that is necessary to protect the public." Id.
(emphasis added).
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Now twenty-nine, Wendy Whitaker13 has been on the sex offender
registry for twelve years for engaging in a consensual sex act as a teenager.14
Unfortunately, Wendy Whitaker's story is not unique.' 5
Whether people like Wendy fit the "typical"' 6 description of a sex
offender does not matter much; the label itself carries with it the power to
13. Wendy continues to fight against the harsh residency restrictions. The Law Office of the
Southern Center for Human Rights, handling the Whitaker case, amended the complaint to attack the
new version of the Georgia law SB 1. THE LAW OFFICE OF THE SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, OVERVIEW OF WHITAKER V. PERDUE, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:06-Cv-140-CC (N.D. GA. 2006) 5(2009), available at http://www.schr.org/files/post/Whitaker/200verview.pdf See Mann v. Ga.
Dep't of Corrections, 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007) (striking down a portion of Georgia's residency
restrictions); see also infra Part IV.B and notes 155-162 and accompanying text (additional
discussion on the ineffectiveness of the residency restrictions). In 2012, Wendy Whitaker will be
eligible to petition the court to release her from the registry requirements. The determination will be
based upon whether the court finds that Wendy "does not pose a substantial risk of perpetrating any
future dangerous sexual offense." § 4 2 -1-12(g)(1).
14. In 1998, three months after Wendy's conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court overturned its
sodomy law. Henry, supra note 1. Chief Justice Robert Benham writing for the six-to-one majority
said, "We cannot think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank as more private and
more deserving of protection from governmental interference than unforced, private, adult sexual
activity." Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998); see also Lisa Keen, Georgia Repeals
Sodomy Law: Notorious Law Meets Unceremonious End, WASHINGTON BLADE, Dec. 4, 1998
available at http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/usa/georgia/ganews21 
.htm. Furthermore, as of July
1, 2006, under the adoption of Keen's Bill, the two-year age difference between Whitaker and her
classmate would have spared her from the registry requirement under a narrow exemption for
"Romeo and Juliet" convictions-laws that lessen or eliminate criminal penalties for young people
close in age who have non-coercive sex with each other. H.B. 1059, 2005-06 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2006), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2005 06/search/hbl059.htm; see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US, Sept. 11, 2007,
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/10685/section/8#_ftnref257. Despite the law immunizing future teens
of legal consequences from engaging in the same consensual behavior as Whitaker, this provision
does not help Wendy because the legislature voted not to apply the law retroactively to those already
on the registry. H.B. 1059.
15. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14. There are countless stories of other teens that
have been forced to register as sex offenders for engaging in underage consensual sex, for example,
a sixteen-year-old boy who was convicted of statutorily raping his fourteen-year-old girlfriend who
he eventually married. Id. at 73. The boy was essentially convicted for having pre-marital sex, and
he is still subject to the sex offender registry requirement. See id at 73-74. Another young man was
forced to register for having consensual sex with his fourteen-year-old girlfriend when he was
nineteen. Id. His mother recounts the law's effect on their family: "Our family has been devastated
by this law that treats a young man in a consensual dating relationship the same as a violent rapist or
a predator of young children." Id Another teen that at the age of seventeen had consensual sex with
a fifteen-year-old girl and is now in college and subject to the registry requirements for statutory
rape describes their heavy burden:
I must register every 90 days. I must register between the hours of 8 and 5 Monday thru
Friday before the 15th [of the] month. Right now I can handle that. I am a student, my
hours are flexible, but once I start work, I will either have to work near the police office I
register at to do it on my lunch hour or take time off from work.
Id. at 74; see also Complaint at 7-20, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-cv-140-CC (N.D. Ga. 2006)[hereinafter Whitaker v. Perdue Complaint], available at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/
public/CJ-GA-0004-0005.pdf.
16. Most people picture a sex offender as looking and acting a certain way. Binghamton
University, Counseling: 20:1 Program-Sex Offender Dynamics, http://www2.binghamton.edu/
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invoke feelings of revulsion, repugnance, anger, and fear.17 Media and pop
culture have taken particular interest in portraying sex offenders as predators
who will inevitably reoffend, despite modem research suggesting
otherwise.1 8 Furthermore, when a child is abducted, sexually assaulted, and
brutally murdered, 9 there is a public demand for reform, whether or not
appropriate or well thought out.20 The United States Constitution exists for
counseling/20-1-program/20-ldynamics.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). The following is a
common description given of sex offender: "He's mean looking, and he carries some type of
weapon. He stalks his victims like a predator, attacking women at night in parks and dark streets, or
breaking into their homes. He leaves them physically brutalized and emotionally scarred." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
17. These feelings are understandable. The crimes that many sex offenders commit are very
destructive not only in the lives of the victims, but in society as a whole.
18. New research suggests that the majority of sex offenders are less likely to re-offend than
most other criminals. See, e.g., Sex Offenders Unlikely to Commit Second Crime, NEW SCIENTIST,
July 6, 2008, at 6, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/mgl9926633.100-sex-offenders-
unlikely-to-commit-second-crime.html% 2 0%0
9 S.O% 2OStats. According to new research from
California, "[]ust 3.2 percent of more than 4000 sex offenders released on parole in 2002 were re-
imprisoned for another sex offence in the subsequent 5 years." Id. The figures in California are
consistent with a 2007 comprehensive study from Minnesota, which found, between 1990 and 2002,
a similar 3.2 percent recidivism rate among sex offenders three years after their release from prison.
Id.
19. A case that received much media attention was the murder of Megan Kanka. In 1994, in a
suburb of Trenton, New Jersey, Megan Kanka was sexually assaulted and murdered by a neighbor
living across the street who, unbeknownst to the Kankas, was a convicted sex offender. Russ
Flanagan, Megan's Legacy: A Child's Death Serves as a Call to Action, EXPRESS-TIMES, Feb. 26,
2004, available at http://www.pennlive.com/news/expresstimes/stories/molesters5 mainbar.html.
As soon as Megan's story hit the news, thousands of dollars in donations began pouring into the
Kanka home. Id Two days after their daughter was murdered the Kankas formed the Megan Nicole
Kanka Foundation, with the mission to expose convicted child molesters living undetected among
the masses. Id. The result of this tragedy was Megan's law, a nationwide law requiring notification
when a convicted sex offender moves into a neighborhood. Id.
20. "Passed hand-to-hand, over 400,000 citizens signed a petition demanding immediate
legislative action on the law that had to be written-Megan's Law. Within an unprecedented eighty-
nine days, the New Jersey State Legislature passed Megan's Law." Megan Nicole Kanka
Foundation, Our Mission, http://megannicolekankafoundation.org/mission.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2010). This is illustrative of the expediency that a nationwide call to action can generate in the
legislature. While this law has been upheld against constitutional scrutiny and is no doubt beneficial
to the protection of our nation's children, there are inherent risks to this kind of reaction. See infra
Part IV. Following Megan's law, new proposed laws continue to go further than the previous
versions, and the speed at which the bills are proposed and passed leave little time to properly weigh
the potential negative consequences and to evaluate potentially less invasive yet still effective
alternatives. See infra Part IV. Especially for sex offenders who, while unpopular, have, in the eyes
of the law, paid their debt to society. See infra Part IV. Registration requirements, residency and
employment restrictions, and applicable "Scarlet Letter" laws all apply after the sex offender leaves
prison. Sunny Hostin, Commentary: A Sex Offender's Scarlet Letter, CNN.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/14/sunny.scarlet/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
Imprisonment in the United States is punishment for the crime committed. See, e.g., Punishment-
Theories of Punishment, http://lawjrank.org/pages/9576/Punishment-THEORIES-PUNISHMENT
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these moments in society, when heated passions cloud judgment and lead to
decisions that fly in the face of fundamental founding principles.21
This Comment explores a legal challenge that has been completely
overlooked in the context of sex offender regulations. The Constitution's
Bill of Attainder Clause 22 has longstanding roots in protecting named
individuals and identifiable groups against legislative punishment without ajudicial trial; however, not until now has its application in the context of sex
offender regulation been considered.23
Part II will acquaint the reader with the nature of bills of attainder, their
origins in England, and the purpose for prohibiting such legislative
enactments in the United States.24 Part III will discuss the United States
Supreme Court's jurisprudence of the Bill of Attainder Clause,
distinguishing prohibited use of legislative action from proper use of
legislative powers.25 Part IV reviews the current state of the law in the area
of sex offender legislation, discussing the predominant influences and
attitudes that underlie much of the legislation, as well as review the common
constitutional challenges and the prevailing trend of their outcomes.26 Part
V first applies the bill of attainder analysis to common regulations affecting
.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). The United States, along with other countries, seeks to punish
criminals for their crimes. The U.S. Department of Justice's mission statement in part reads: "to
seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Our Mission
Statement, http://www.usdoj.gov/02organizations/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). There are basically
two general theories of punishment: utilitarian and retributive. Punishment-Theories of
Punishment, supra. "The utilitarian theory ... seeks to punish offenders to discourage, or 'deter,'
future wrongdoing. The retributive theory seeks to punish offenders because they deserve to be
punished." Id. In the United States, the most widely accepted justification for punishment is
retribution. Id Criminal sentencing in the United States "is always, at least in part, a form of
retribution." Id Retributive punishment seeks to restore the balance caused by the wrongdoer and is
thought of as necessary and justified to protect the legitimate rights of both society and the offender.
Id "Punishment . . . allows an offender to pay the debt to society and then return to society,
theoretically free of guilt and stigma." Id.
21. Our Constitution does not protect only the popular or benevolent, but those that other
civilizations have deemed unfit to survive or unworthy of dignity. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51(James Madison) ("In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and
oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker
individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as [such] . . . even the stronger
individuals are prompted . . . to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as
well as the more powerful."). American ideals are to treat our criminals more humanely than many
other countries. See President Barak Obama, Speech to Congress (Feb. 24, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/24/Politics/main4826494.shtml?source=RSSat
tr=Politics_4826494) ("To overcome extremism, we must also be vigilant in upholding the values
our troops defend-because there is no force in the world more powerful than the example of
America .... And that is why I can stand here tonight and say without exception or equivocation
that the United States of America does not torture.").
22. "No bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
23. See infra Parts 11-III, notes 30-116, and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 51-116 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 117-166 and accompanying text.
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sex offenders, and then discusses the interpretational issues raised therein.
Part VI explores a more serious problem than those supposedly caused by
sex offenders, addresses its implications, and proposes possible alternatives
to the current regulatory scheme.28 Part VII will conclude this Comment.29
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BILLS OF ATTAINDER
A bill of attainder is a "legislative act which inflicts punishment without
a judicial trial."30 The purpose for the inclusion of the Bill of Attainder
Clause in the United States Constitution is best understood through an
overview of its past.
A. Origins and Early Use
The bill of attainder has its roots as a parliamentary act that sentenced to
death one or more specific persons.31 The act would declare a person to be
"tainted,"32 and was used by the Monarch in England, during the sixteenth,
seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries to deal "with persons who had
attempted, or threatened to attempt, to overthrow the government" without
having to endure the "inconvenience" of a trial.33  "In addition to the death
sentence, attainder generally carried with it a 'corruption of blood,' which
meant that the attainted party's heirs could not inherit [the condemned's]
27. See infra notes 167-234 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 235-256 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 266-276 and accompanying text.
30. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866); see also id at 290 (citing John
Hamilton's History of the Republic of the United States). "A bill of attainder is a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without judicial trial." Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323). It includes
"legislative acts which take away the life, liberty, or property of particular named [or easily
ascertainable] persons [or group of persons] because the legislature thinks them guilty of conduct
which deserves punishment. U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946).
31. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1965).
32. Issac M. Mcphee, The British Bill of Attainder: A British Law Enabling Conviction Without
Trial, SUITE1O.COM, Feb. 11, 2008, http://law.suitel0l.com/article.cfmi/thebillofattainder.
"[Tihe word 'attainder' is derived from the middle English word 'attainted,' meaning, 'having
stigma imparted upon."' Id.
33. Brown, 381 U.S. at 441 (citing the following as examples of these acts: "3 Jac. 1, c. 2; 10 &
II Will. 3, c. 13; 13 Will. 3, c. 3; 9 Geo. 1, c. 15"). "Whereas Habeas Corpus guaranteed a fair trial
by jury, a bill of attainder bypassed this. [Using this writ suspended] a person's civil rights and
guaranteed that the person would be found guilty of the crimes stated in the bill as long as the Royal
Assent was gained." Bill of Attainder Leaming Site, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/Bill-of-
Attainder.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
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property."3 4 The bill of pains and penalties was functionally the same as the
bill of attainder except that it "prescribed a penalty short of death,35 e.g.,
banishment, 36 deprivation of the right to vote,37  or exclusion of the
designated party's sons from Parliament."38
It was common for bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties to
"inflict their deprivations upon relatively large groups of people;" 39 some
"named the parties to whom they were to apply," while some "simply
described them." 40 Further, some left the targeted parties a way to escape
the penalty, while others did not.4 1 While stemming from England, use of
34. Brown, 381 U.S. at 441 (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD
COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 565 (Thomas ed. 1818); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,THREE HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 96 (1956)). But cf U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3,
cl. 2. ("Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted," thus not affecting the heirs of a traitor.).
35. Practically all bills of attainder referenced in the United States Constitution are actually bills
of pains and penalties because they refer to legislative punishment that does not result in death.
"The Constitution in prohibiting bills of attainder undoubtedly included bills of pains and penalties,"
as explained in the majority's holding in Cummings. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317 n.6.
36. "[B]anishment was an effective punishment because it contemplated that offenders leaving a
settled community would necessarily wander in the wilderness, shamed by their loved ones and
unwelcome in other settlements." THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreediction
ary.com/Banishment (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY,http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/banishment (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). For a
comparison to sex offender regulation see infra note 156 and accompanying text.
37. See generally WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-to vote#Criminality (last
visited Feb. 8, 2009) (entry for "Suffrage") ("Many countries restrict the voting rights of convicted
criminals. Some countries, and some U.S. states, also deny the right to vote to those convicted of
serious crimes after they are released from prison."); see Roger Clegg, Felon Disenfranchisement Is
Constitutional, and Justified, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER, http://ratify.constitutioncenter.org/
education/ForEducators/iewpoints/FelonDisenfranchisementIsConstitutional,AndJustified.shtml
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
38. Brown, 381 U.S. at 441 (footnotes omitted).
39. Id.at461.
40. Id. at 442 (footnote omitted).
41. See Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 88 (1960)(referring to the fact that the members of the class affected by the statute could extricate themselves
from the class at will as one factor that tended to show that the Act in question was not directed at a
specific group of people but rather set forth a generally applicable definition). A number of court
decisions have examined the factor of "escapability" to determine whether an act is punitive in
nature and whether it singles out a particular group; different courts have, in doing so, differed
regarding the amount of determinative weight the factor should be afforded. See Am. Commc'ns
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (finding the factor to be probative of whether the statute was
punitive in nature); see also Brown, 381 U.S. at 457 n.32 (citation omitted) (finding that
inescapability is not an "absolute prerequisite" to a finding of attainder, because "[s]uch an absolute
rule would have flown in the face of explicit precedent as well as the historical background of the
constitutional prohibition"). The precedent being referring to is the Supreme Court's decision in
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 324 (1866). "A number of ante-Constitution bills of
attainder inflicted deprivations upon named or described persons or groups, but offered them the
option of avoiding the deprivations, e.g., by swearing allegiance to the existing government."
Brown, 381 U.S. at 457 n.32 (citing Del. Laws c. 29b (1778); 1778 Mass. Acts c. 13; III JOHN C.
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bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties did not end there.42 During
the American Revolution,43 several state legislatures used bills of attainder
to condemn British loyalists called Torries and confiscate their property."
The American version included the traditional abuse of procedure with a
complete disregard of due process rights.45 It was apparent very quickly that
such legislative acts had great potential to do harm, especially against the
weak and unpopular, and thus it was necessary to guard against such danger.
B. Prohibition in the United States Constitution
The Framers believed barriers had to be erected so that the legislature
would not overstep its authority and perform functions of other branches of
government, namely the judiciary.4 The Bill of Attainder Clause was
erected to be such a barrier.47 Thus, while the Bill of Attainder Clause was
to function as one means to accomplish the general principle of
fractionalized power, it also "reflected the Framers' belief that the
Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and
HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 25 (1859)).
42. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
43. One of the motivations for the American Revolution itself was anger at the injustices of
attainder. Bill of Attainder, http://www.experiencefestival.com/a/bill%200f/20attainder/id/
1932370 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
44. Brown, 381 U.S. at 442. See e.g., DWIGHT HOLBROOK, THE WICKHAM CLAIM: BEING AN
INQUIRY INTO THE ATrAINDER OF PARKER WICKHAM (1986) (Wickham, an elected official who
was well known for his pro-Loyalist views, was forced to forfeit all of his property without
compensation and was banished from the state under threat of death in 1779 after New York's
Legislature passed a bill of attainder. Until the day of his death, he vigorously maintained his
innocence and ultimately died without ever being granted a trial.).
45. "Bills of attainder are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 176
(8th ed. 2004).
46. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47,48,49, 51 (James Madison), No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
47. Alexander Hamilton, showing much foresight and vision, put it like this:
Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to gratify
momentary passions, by letting into the government principles and precedents which
afterwards prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of disqualification,
disfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legislature. The dangerous
consequences of this power are manifest. If the legislature can disfranchise any number
of citizens at pleasure by general descriptions, it may soon confine all the votes to a small
number of partisans, and establish an aristocracy or an oligarchy; if it may banish at
discretion all those whom particular circumstances render obnoxious, without hearing or
trial, no man can be safe, nor know when he may be the innocent victim of a prevailing
faction. The name of liberty applied to such a government, would be a mockery of
common sense.
III JOHN C. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1859) (quoting
Alexander Hamilton).
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juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness, of, and levying
appropriate punishment upon, specific persons.""8  Inclusion of the Bill of
Attainder Clause in the United States Constitution was intended, "not as a
narrow, technical ... prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the
separation of powers, [and] a general safeguard against legislative exercise
of the judicial function, or more simply-trial by legislature." 49 After its
inclusion, the United State Supreme Court began to interpret the Framers'
intent in order to lay out workable analysis to determine what legislative
action constituted a forbidden bill of attainder.so
III. DEVELOPMENT OF BILL OF ATTAINDER CASE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES
Since the Civil War, the Court has taken up the issue of attainder a
number of times; and in doing so, it has often focused on the right to practice
a profession, the ability to escape the levied legislative punishment,5' and the
relationship, or lack thereof, between the enactment and a targeted
individual's fitness in those "pursuits and professions."52 Furthermore, the
Court has developed a uniquely American imprimatur in its decisions,
invalidating as bills of attainder legislation barring specified persons or
groups from pursuing various professions, especially where employment
bans were permanent.53 The cases that follow show the maturation of the
court's analysis, culminating with the blueprint for applying the bill of
attainder analysis.
A. Cummings v. Missouri
In December 1866, the Court decided a pair of cases which established
present day precedent for what constitutes a violation of the Bill of Attainder
Clause.54 Cummings v. Missouri involved a provision of the Missouri
48. Brown, 381 U.S. at 445.
49. Id. at 442. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 373-74 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). James Madison wrote: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Id.
50. See infra Part iI.
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319 (1866) (discussing the lack of
connection between Mr. Cummings being unable to take loyalty oath and his fitness to perform the
duties of his profession as a minister); infra note 55 and accompanying text.
53. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 474-75 (1977).
54. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 277; Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). Ex
Parte Garland also was based on a similar oath to Cummings, prohibiting the practice of law without
taking the loyalty oath, and the Court held the same way. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at
398. Neither case has been overruled.
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Reconstruction Constitution, which required persons to take an Oath of
Loyalty as a prerequisite to practicing a profession. 5 In invalidating the
Missouri constitutional provision as a prohibited bill of attainder, the
caselaid the foundation for the "proposition that legislative acts, no matter
what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the
Constitution." More specifically, the Court declared that one of the
fundamental and usual characteristics of a bill of attainder is the deprivation
of a person or group of their profession or livelihood, especially when
permanent, and without the safeguards of a judicial trial.
B. United States v. Lovett
In Lovett, the Court added depth to its understanding of the role that
legislative intent and context surrounding the proposed legislation plays in
the bill of attainder analysis. 9  Based on United States House of
Representatives agenda to weed out people it considered "subversives,"o
Congress passed the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943, which
55. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 288. Cummings was convicted of practicing as a Christian minister
without taking the oath. Id. The oath required an applicant to affirm that he had never given aid or
comfort to persons engaged in hostility to the United States and had never "been a member of or
connected with any order, society, or organization, inimical to the government of the United States."
Id. at 282. The Court discussed the inherent problems with the fact that at one time the State of
Missouri had been "engaged in hostility" against the government of the United States as it was a
member of the Confederate States during the Civil War. Id. at 315. The Court then appropriately
noted that "an oath which requires a party to swear that he has committed no act of hostility against
the State government, and no act of hostility as against the government of the United States, is an
oath which . .. [is] impossible"; because if the individual supported the Union while in a confederate
state, he has acted in "hostility" against the state. Id.
56. Id. at 329-31.
57. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946). What the Court meant by punishment
"without a judicial trial" raises some interpretational questions that are taken up infra Part V and
note 230 and accompanying text.
58. See 41 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 622
(1792). Additionally, the Cummings Court determined that the oath had "no possible relation to [an
individual's] fitness for those pursuits and professions," which was another factor the Court
considered. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 315.
59. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 303.
60. Id. at 311 n.3 (quoting H. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 5) (The Act defines
"subversive activity" as "conduct intentionally destructive of or inimical to the Government of the
United States-that which seeks to undermine its institutions, or to distort its functions, or to impede
its projects, or to lessen its efforts, the ultimate end being to overturn it all. Such activity may be
open and direct as by effort to overthrow, or subtle and indirect as by sabotage.").
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permanently prohibited specifically named individuals from receiving any
further compensation from their government jobs, and prevented them from
further employment in government service, other than as soldiers or jurors.1
To evaluate the true legislative nature of the Act,62 the Court explored not
only the Congressional Record, but also the larger context over the eight
years leading up to the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, which was at
issue.6' The Court found an extensive legislative history, which revealed
that the true purpose of the legislation was to "purge" government agencies
of government employees that Congress deemed "unfit."6" In part, what the
Court found most troubling were the solemn reservations that many
legislators raised in protest of the Act.65  Despite having signed the bill,
President Roosevelt felt compelled to voice his objection saying, "I have
been forced to yield, to avoid delaying our conduct of the war. But I cannot
so yield without placing on record my view that this provision is not only
unwise and discriminatory, but unconstitutional." Ultimately, in holding
that the Act was a bill of attainder prohibited by the Constitution, the Court
focused on traditional factors that the Act imposed: punishment on
specifically named individuals 68 without a judicial trial.69
61. Id. at 305. Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943 is what was at
issue in the case. Id. at 305-06. The Act, by way of an amendment, said in relevant part that after
November 15, 1943, no further salary or compensation would be paid to named respondents, who
were workers in various government agencies, and thereafter the only role in the government they
could serve were as jurors or soldiers. Id. at 305.
62. Congress was not necessarily explicit or forthright about their intent and put forth its main
defense that the Act was nothing more than of an appropriations nature, which was well within the
rights of the Congress to pass under the Constitution. Id. at 306; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, cl. 18,
and § 9, cl. 7 (sections which empower Congress to "lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States," and in that pursuit
grants Congress the power to make certain appropriations by law).
63. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 308. In its analysis, the Court traced some of the events that led up to
current legislation at issue: in May 1938, the Committee on Un-American Activities ("which became
known as the Dies Committee, after its Chairman Congressman Martin Dies") was formed, with the
express purpose to make "lists of people and organizations it [deemed] 'subversive'; following the
creation of the Dies Committee, other acts were passed that had the same function as the Act in
Lovett-namely to prohibit anyone who "was a member of a political party or organization that
advocated the overthrow of our constitutional form of Government" from holding a government job.
Id. at 308 (citing § 9A of the Hatch Act, 53 Stat. 1148, 1149; §§ 15(f) and 17(b) of the Emergency
Relief Appropriation Act of 1941, 54 Stat. 611). Furthermore, the Court looked at the nature of
statements made in past hearings as well as those made in the context of the current legislation. Id.
64. Id at 313-14.
65. Id. at 309. According to the Congressional Record, debate over the "appropriations" bill
spanned several days because members of Congress had numerous doubts and concerns. 89 CONG.
REC. 474, 479-86 (1943). All who participated in the debates agreed the charges brought against the
individuals were serious and carried vast consequences. Id. at 651. During the debates, some
legislators referred to the proposed bill as "legislative lynching," comparing the procedure to that
used in the French Chamber of Deputies, during the Reign of Terror. Id. at 651-54.
66. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 313 (quoting H. Doc. No. 78-264 (1st Sess. 1993)).
67. Id at 313. Not only was the legislation designed to get rid of all existing employees that
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C. United States v. Brown
In Brown, the Court's analysis goes further to expand the concept of
punishment and specificity in finding a bill of attainder.70  The statute71 at
issue made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an
officer or employee of a labor union.72 Instead of laying out particular acts
that would disqualify a person from specific employment, Congress made
the determination that members of the Communist Party possessed certain
feared but un-enumerated characteristics, which made them more likely to
"initiate political strikes" against the U.S. Government.73 "The command of
the Bill of Attainder Clause [is] that a legislature can provide that persons
possessing certain characteristics must abstain from certain activities, but
must leave to other tribunals the task of deciding who possesses those
characteristics." 74  Moreover, there needs to be a "demonstrable
were deemed "subversives," but also to permanently bar other federal employing agencies from
hiring them in the future. Id at 313-14. The Court relied on precedent set forth in Cummings
regarding the deprivation, especially in perpetuity, of one's right to practice in a certain profession at
the hands of the Government as a form of punishment. Id at 316; supra note 57 and accompanying
text. The Court infers that to leave respondent's without judicial remedy after congressional action
inflicted serious harm to their reputation and earning capacity would also be punishment and most
certainly outside of the Framer's intent. Id. at 314; see supra notes 49, 69 and accompanying text.
68. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316 n.4. This is one of the usual characteristics of bills of attainder. See
WOODDESON, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
69. Lovett, 328 U.S at 317-18. Bills of Attainder were proscribed because the framers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights saw too clearly the risks to liberty that legislative trials and
punishment would create in the land of freedom that they envisioned. Id. at 314, 318 (." [A] limited
constitution ... [is] one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such
... as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, [or] ex post facto laws .... Limitations of this kind can
be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it
must be to declare all acts contrary to . . . the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing." (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78
(Alexander Hamilton)).
70. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1958 & Supp. IV).
72. Brown, 381 U.S. at 440.
73. Id at 450. The Court found that the Act was not exempted from being a bill of attainder just
because it inflicted its deprivation "upon the membership of [a group] rather than upon a list of
named individuals . . . ." Id. at 461.
74. Id. at 454 n.29. The Court rejected Congress's argument that they did no more than insert in
place of a list of characteristics the "semantically equivalent" shorthand of "membership in the
Communist Party." Id. at 455 ("The designation of Communists as those persons likely to cause
political strikes is not the substitution of a semantically equivalent phrase . . . ."). "In a number of
decisions, [the Supreme] Court has pointed out the fallacy of the suggestion that membership in the
Communist Party, or any other political organization, can be regarded as an alternative, but
equivalent, expression for a list of undesirable characteristics." Id. Nevertheless, the Court did not
intimate that a legislature could never use "a shorthand phrase to summarize the characteristics with
1313
relationship" between the aims Congress sought to avoid, the individuals
who would carry out those aims, and the characteristics of the target group.75
The Court determined that no legitimate relationship existed because even if
Congress had good reason to believe that some Communists would use their
positions in unions to bring about political upheaval, "it can[not]
automatically be inferred that all members share their evil purposes or
participate in their illegal conduct."7 6  Further, in support of the Court's
determination that no legitimate relationship existed, it drew contrast
between the current case and Board of Governors ofFederal Reserve System
v. Agnew,n a case where the Act in question was trying to prevent a
fiduciary conflict of interest.7 As such, Agnew illustrated a meaningful
distinction from section 504, which inflicted its deprivation "upon the
members of a political group thought to present a threat to the national
which it is concerned," but confined it to specific circumstance; for example:
[A] legislature might determine that persons afflicted with a certain disease which has as
one of its symptoms a susceptibility to uncontrollable seizures should not be licensed to
operate dangerous machinery. In enacting a statute to achieve this goal, the legislature
could name the disease instead of listing the symptoms, for in doing so it would merely
be substituting a shorthand phrase which conveys the same meaning.
Id. at 454 n.29. Congress oversteps its authority when it engages in the "forbidden fact-finding"
about individuals and groups that the Constitution reserves for the judiciary. Id. at 464 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("The legislature may focus on a particular group or class only when ... it is common
knowledge that all, not just some, members of the group possess the feared characteristics and thus
such legislative designation would require no legislative fact-finding about individuals.").
75. Id. at 456. A compelling factor for the Court in making its decision that 29 U.S.C. § 504 was
a bill of attainder was that it inflicted its "deprivation upon all members of [an ideological
organization] without regard to whether there exist[s] any demonstrable relationship between the
characteristics of the person involved and the evil Congress sought to eliminate." Id The Court in
part relied on direction from Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (following the
proposition that Constitutional violations can result when an act "too broadly and indiscriminately"
restricts constitutionally protected freedoms).
76. Brown, 381 U.S. at 456 (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246
(1957)) (emphasis added).
77. 329 U.S. 441 (1947). The Court distinguished section 504 at issue in this case from section
32 of the Banking Act of 1933, the subject of Agnew, which the Court in that case held was not a bill
of attainder. Brown, 381 U.S. at 453-56. Agnew was a suit to review or enjoin the action of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in removing respondents from office as directors
of a national bank on the ground that they were employees of a firm "primarily engaged" in
underwriting within the meaning of section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933. Agnew, 329 U.S. at 441;
see also infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
78. Brown, 381 U.S. at 453. Section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 stated that a person must not
be primarily engaged
in the issue, floatation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or
through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, and at the
same time serve as an employee or officer of a member bank, unless by special
exemption by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) (emphasis added). The purpose of the legislation, as the Brown Court
characterized it, was as a type of conflict of interest law, which had as its primary purpose to protect
against undue influence over the investment policies of the member banks or the investment advice
it gave its customers. Brown, 381 U.S. at 453.
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security."' 9 Furthermore, the Court, believing that it would be antiquated to
limit punishment to only a retributive purpose, found it appropriate to
expand the meaning of punishment in order to "serve several purposes;
retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventative."80  In doing so, the
Court relied on historical considerations that many English and early
American bills of attainder were enacted for preventative purposes.81 This
Court, like the one in Lovett, took the combination of factors together to
determine section 504 to be a prohibited bill of attainder.82
79. Brown, 381 U.S. at 453. Agnew was further distinguished because section 32 incorporated
no judgment censuring or condemning any person or group of people, rather Congress relied upon
"its general knowledge of human psychology" to formulate its conclusion that "concurrent holding
of the two designated positions would present a temptation to any [person]-not just certain [people]
or members of a certain political party." Id. at 454. This type of target group was typical of English
and early American bills of attainder. Id. at 453; see also WOODDESON, supra note 57 and
accompanying text. Moreover, it was common for traditional English bills of attainder to inflict
deprivation on named individuals, as well as upon large groups, by description rather than by name.
Brown, 381 U.S. at 461 (citing the following examples: "12 Car. 2, c. 30; 19 Geo. 2, c. 26; 11 Geo.
3, c. 55"). The Court follows the principle that because an act deprives a group, like the Communist
Party in this instance, as opposed to a list of named individuals does not take it out of the category of
a bill of attainder. Id. (This is consistent with earlier Supreme Court decisions in Cummings and
Garland where the same type of Act-the denials affected a whole group and not named persons-
was struck down.).
80. Brown, 381 U.S. at 458. Some are critical of those who would suggest that prevention is
punishment, believing that, because prevention purports to serve a public safety purpose, it is
somehow less than punishment; however, the Brown Court expressly states the contrary. Id. "[T]he
legislature made a judgment, undoubtedly based largely on past acts and associations . .. that a given
person or group was likely to cause trouble . .. and therefore inflicted deprivations upon that person
or group in order to keep it from bringing about the feared event. Id. at 458-59. Further, one of the
very justifications for imprisonment (which is punishment) in our society is to prevent future re-
offenses and harm by the convicted during their time of incarceration. See id.; see also
Punishment-Theories of Punishment, supra note 20 and accompanying text ("[L]aws that specify
punishment for criminal conduct should be designed to deter future criminal conduct .... General
deterrence means that the punishment should prevent other people from committing criminal acts.
The punishment serves as an example to the rest of society, and it puts others on notice that criminal
behavior will be punished. Specific deterrence means that the punishment should prevent the same
person from committing crimes. Specific deterrence works in two ways. First, an offender may be
put in jail or prison to physically prevent her from committing another crime for a specified period.
Second, this incapacitation is designed to be so unpleasant that it will discourage the offender from
repeating her criminal behavior."). The prevention/deterrence purpose is likely the most relevant to
try to strike down sex offender regulations because often the main purpose for the legislation is to
prevent the offenders from inflicting future harm. See Punishment-Theories of Punishment, supra
note 20.
81. Brown, 381 U.S. at 458-59 ("[T]he legislature made a judgment, undoubtedly based largely
on past acts and associations . . . that a given person or group was likely to cause trouble . . . and
therefore inflicted deprivations upon that person or group in order to keep it from bringing about the
feared event.").
82. Id. at 461-62. Furthermore, another consideration here, as in previous cases where a bill of
attainder was found, was that individuals who are subject to the Act would be criminally liable if
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D. Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group
In contrast to Brown, this case involved the Court distinguishing
legislation that did not meet the requirements to be a prohibited bill of
attainder.8 1 In this case, the provision at issue-found in the Military
Selective Service Act-denied federal financial assistance 84 to male students
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six who failed to register for the
military draft.85  The Court rejected the argument that the Act specifically
targeted non-registrants in the same way that Cummings and Ex Parte
Garland6 had targeted those that could not take the Oath of Loyalty.87 One
main reason was that in this case, the affected status was completely
reversible (or escapable), such that a student who wanted federal assistance
could correct their deficient status simply by registering for selective
88service. Moreover, in discussing whether the legislation had a punitive
purpose, the Court was satisfied that Congress did not intend to punish"
because rather than single out those that intentionally did not register for
punishment, Congress chose to treat both willful and unintentional non-
registrants the same by allowing both groups to avail themselves of financial
aid simply by registering late.90 Therefore, the provision survived the bill of
attainder challenge.91
they did not leave their union positions. Id. at 450.
83. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 858-59 (1984).
84. See Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965.
85. Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 854 n.13. The Court noted that Congress was aware that "more
than half a million young men had failed to comply with the registration requirement." Id. at 854.
86. See supra note 54.
87. Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 849.
88. Id. at 850-51. This was not available to the petitioners in Cummings or Garland, who were
unable to take themselves out of the group that could not honestly take the oath. See supra notes 41,
55 and accompanying text.
89. The fact that federal authority places burdens on citizens does not automatically make those
burdens punishment. Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 470 (1977); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "Figuratively speaking all
discomforting action may be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be
enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such deprivation." Lovett, 328 U.S. at
324. In this particular case the legislative history reflected the sentiment that students who wanted to
further their education at the expense of their country should not expect to receive the benefits
without accepting their fair share of responsibilities owed to their government. 128 CONG. REc. 7
9664-65 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); see also id. at 9664 (remarks of Sen. Mattingly); id at
18,356 (remarks of Rep. Montgomery).
90. Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 855. The legislative history of the Act indicates that its purpose
was to further non-punitive goals. Id. at 842. Further, the Act "imposes none of the burdens
historically associated with punishment." Id. The Court held that the pertinent law found in section
3 of the Military Selective Service Act required that every male born after January 1, 1963, register
for the draft within thirty days of his eighteenth birthday; this regulation merely restricts financial
assistance to those who fail to comply with the law. See id. at 848-49. "Congress sought, not to
punish . . . but to promote compliance with the draft registration requirement and fairness in the
allocation of scarce federal resources." Id. at 855-56. It should be noted however, that legislative
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E. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services
In this case, former President Richard Nixon challenged the
constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act,92 which directed him to give up custody over his Presidential papers
and tape recordings and grant them public access.93 In its determination of
whether the Act constituted a forbidden bill of attainder, the Court created a
two-tiered test consistent with historical considerations and case law.94 First,
courts must determine whether an act targets an individual or group
specifically.95 Then, a court must determine whether the legislative act
inflicts punishment within one of three tests formulated by the Court:
historical, functional, and motivational.9 6 Unless both the specificity and
punitive prongs are satisfied, an enactment is not an unconstitutional bill of
attainder. 97
"[L]egislative acts ... that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the
Constitution.",9 8 In the midst of articulating the rule for specificity, it also
appeared to create an exception; that if one voluntarily took action, which
required a legislature to "re-act," then it is possible to create a "legitimate
intent to encourage compliance with a particular law does not conclusively establish that a statute is
innocuous or the legitimate regulation of conduct. Id. at 851-52.
91. Id. at 858-59.
92. Pub. L. No. 93-526, §§ 104-05 (1974). The Court determined that the Act did not violate the
following: the separation of powers (because nothing in the Act rendered it excessively disruptive of
the Executive Branch); the Presidential privilege doctrine; appellant's constitutional privacy rights
(because purely private information was to be returned to appellant); appellant's First Amendment
rights; or the Bill of Attainder Clause (because the Act did not have a punitive intent nor did it
depend upon a congressional determination of appellant's blameworthiness). Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425.
Only the bill of attainder analysis will be discussed.
93. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 425. Nixon was arguing for an individual or defined group to be attainted
whenever either was compelled to bear burdens which the individual or group dislikes. Id. at 470.
In rejecting such an expansive view, the Court said, "[it] would cripple the very process of
legislating . . . invalidating every Act of Congress or the States that legislatively burdens some
person or groups but not all other plausible individuals." Id. at 470-71.
94. Id. at 472-74.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 472, 475, 478-79.
97. See id. Due to the unique circumstances in this case, the Court postulated one final
consideration that is useful in determining whether the legislature sought to inflict punishment on an
individual: an inquiry into the "existence of less burdensome alternatives" by which the legislature
could have achieved its legitimate non-punitive objectives. Id. at 482.
98. Id. at 485. The most significant contribution to the understanding of what meets the
specificity requirement was explained in Brown, supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
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class of one." 99 The Court found that due to the fact that Nixon had
volitionally and singly entered into the "Nixon-Sampson agreement," which
by its terms called for the imminent destruction of certain materials, he
constituted a "legitimate class of one." 00
Next, the Court's analysis turned to whether the deprivations imposed
on Nixon by the enactment comprised punishment.'o' First, the historical
test focuses on whether the Act imposes traditional punishment historically
associated with bills of attainder.'0 2 Normally reserved for persons who
were considered disloyal to the Crown or State, a wide range of punishments
have traditionally accompanied bills of pains and penalties, such as
"imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property by the
sovereign."103  The Court found the closest thing to a colorable argument
that Nixon had suffered any form of traditional punishment was that the Act
ordered the General Services Administration to retain control over records,
which Nixon claimed as his property. 104  However, the Court found this
argument to be fatally flawed because section 105 of the Act authorized the
district court to pay just compensation for the retention of the "property."' 05
99. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. The Court by its finding intimates that if the subject of the
legislation voluntarily puts himself into a position where the legislation must "re-act," then that may
constitute a "legitimate party of one" and thus fall short of the specificity requirement. See id
100. See id Interestingly, however, in this case the Court still continued on to the punishment
analysis, and thus it can be inferred that if the Court had found punitive intent, it still might have
struck down the Act as an unlawful bill of attainder. See id
101. Both the Brown Court as well as the Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383
n.30 (1968), did not alter the requirement that a person who challenges an act as a bill of attainder
must establish that the legislature's action carries with it a punitive intent and not merely the
legitimate exercise of regulating conduct. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 476. In meeting this end, the Nixon
Court once more confirmed that an examination is necessary of the purposes served by the alleged
bill of attainder. Id
102. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473; see also supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. There are a
litany of examples from both England and the United States of such abuses of parliamentary and
legislative power, which inflicted deprivations so unduly severe and inappropriate to non-punitive
ends, which necessarily violate the Bill of Attainder Clause. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473; U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9. "In England, a bill of attainder originally connoted a parliamentary Act sentencing a named
individual or identifiable members of a group to death." Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473 (citing I Jac. 2, c. 2.
(1685)). More relevant in today's analysis are bills of pains and penalties, which are legislative acts
that inflict punishment other than execution. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 323-24 (1946);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866).
103. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474-75. Our country has produced its own impermissible legislative
punishment: "a legislative enactment barring designated individuals or groups from participation in
specified employments or vocations, a mode of punishment commonly employed against those
legislatively branded as disloyal." Id. at 474. For examples, see supra Part III.A (barring clergy
from ministry in the absence of subscribing to a loyalty oath); supra Part III.B (barring named
individuals from Government employment); and supra Part III.C (barring Communist Party
members from offices in labor unions). A legislative act, which imposes any of these sanctions on
named individuals or identifiable groups, would be immediately constitutionally suspect. Nixon, 433
U.S. at 473.
104. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475.
105. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Moreover, at the time of the decision, the fact was unsettled as to
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Second, the functional test's purpose is to analyze the type and severity
of burdens imposed by the law at issue to see if they can be reasonably said
to further any non-punitive legislative purposes.106 "Where such legitimate
legislative purposes do not appear, it is reasonable to conclude that
punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose
of the decisionmakers."o' However, in this case, legitimate legislative
justifications for the Act's passage were readily apparent.108 Congress
expressed that the Act was in the public interest because the materials to be
destroyed via the agreement had "general historical significance." 09
Furthermore, the Court was concerned that the public would be denied
access to all the facts surrounding the Watergate scandal, and if that were the
situation it would not aid in the deterrence of others who would try similar
scheming pursuits."1 0
The last possible test to find punishment is purely motivational. It looks
at legislative record to determine if there is evidence of a legislative intent to
punish."' In Nixon, the Act expressly provided President Nixon the right to
an expedited judicial proceeding where he could present and assert all
available defenses and privileges. 112 Then, the Court found probative that
the record revealed that when opponents of the Act accused Congress of
trying to pass a bill of attainder, the accusations were met directly and
rebutted immediately with great fervor."' However, the Court made it clear
whether the materials in question were the property of Nixon or of the Government. Id. at 475 n.39.
106. Id. at 475-76; see also Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 319-20; Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
107. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 476.
108. Id. First, there was an agreement ("Nixon-Sampson agreement") which Nixon voluntarily
entered into that expressed intentions to destroy some of the former President's materials. Id In
passing the Act, Congress stressed the importance of preserving the information contained in those
Presidential materials to move forward with the prosecutions of the Watergate-related crimes. Id. at
476-77; H.R. REP. No. 93-1507, at 2 (1974). Moreover, the Court noted that it is a fair exercise of
legislative power to guarantee the availability of evidence for use at criminal trials; thus this case
was an example of "non-punitive legislative policy making." Nixon, 433 U.S at 477-78.
109. Nixon, 433 U.S at 477 (Congress expressed its belief that "[t]he information in these
materials will be of great value to the political health and vitality of the United States.").
110. Id;S.REP.No.93-1181,at4(1974).
111. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478. The analysis here will examine Senate and House Committee
Reports, floor debates, and other statements made in legislative hearings about the act at issue to
determine if the collective legislative intent was to punish an individual or group for blameworthy
offenses. Id 478-79; see also supra notes 63, 65 and accompanying text.
112. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480.
113. Id "This bill does not contain a word to the effect that Mr. Nixon is guilty of any violation
of the law. It does not inflict any punishment on him. So it has no more relation to a bill of attainder
... than my style of pulchritude is to be compared to that of the Queen of Sheba." Id (quoting Sen.
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that it did not wish to suggest that such a formal, express "legislative
announcement of moral blameworthiness or punishment is necessary" for
finding an unlawful bill of attainder.1 4 In the present case, the Court found
that the lack of evidence illustrating a punitive purpose, when combined
with the judicial safeguards built into the Act, was enough to show that the
legislature was not trying to usurp the judicial function with the creation of
an unlawful bill of attainder."'
The case law provides the blueprint to challenge a legislative enactment
as a prohibited bill of attainder; however, the doctrine for many courts is
superficially esoteric especially when applied in the context of sex offender
legislation, which is complex and in constant flux.116
IV. THE CURRENT CLIMATE OF SEX OFFENDER REGULATIONS AND THE
GAPING HOLE FOR THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE TO FILL
Legislation in the sex offender context is one of those unique areas of
the law because public outrage and inflamed passions are often the impetus
of much of the legislation.' 7 In part, this is due to legislators who have their
own families' interests in mind, leading them to make laws based on the stir
of emotions that sex offenders generate, and not necessarily on what is best
Ervin's comments in response to Sen. Hruska's criticism that the Bill inflicted punishment through
deprivation of the appellant's papers without a judicial trial).
114. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480 (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946)).
Nevertheless, in this case the Court felt that the noticeable absence of legislative history to suggest a
punitive intent was indicative of non-punitive intentions and strongly undercut one of the major
concerns that prompted the prohibition against bills of attainder: "the fear that the legislature, in
seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it expedient openly to assume the
mantle of judge-or, worse still, lynch mob." Id. at 480 (citing the Brown Court's citation of
Alexander Hamilton's concern "that legislatures might cater to the 'momentary passions' of a 'free
people, in times of heat and violence .... .'").
115. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480; see supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing that both the
specificity and punishment prongs must be satisfied for a court to find a bill of attainder).
116. Despite the fact that the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws exist in
the same article, section, and clause of the Constitution, there is a startling and overwhelming void
of challenges based on the Bill of Attainder Clause. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see
also Wright v. Iowa Dep't of Corrs., 747 N.W.2d 213, 214, 217-18 (Iowa 2008) (sex offender
challenged the constitutionality of being subject to the Iowa state residency restriction when his
conviction pre-dated the registration requirement). In Wright, among the many challenges, all of
which the Iowa Supreme Court rejected, was one based on the Bill of Attainder Clause. Id. at 217.
The Iowa high court dismissed the claim with minimal analysis, interpreting the requirement that
legislative punishment be without a judicial trial to mean Wright's trial of guilt, without
consideration for the current residency law's imposition of new deprivation. Id at 218. This
Court's statutory interpretation likely flies in the face of the Framers' intent, because in many cases
it will leave individuals newly punished without judicial remedy. See infra Part VI.A and notes
230-234 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers in the area of public
outrage for which the Bill of Attainder Clause was instituted to protect against).
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for the community."' For this reason, the promulgation of sex offender
regulations are often hastily written, based on antiquated ideas and
overbroad without sound reason." 9 Not surprisingly, the media has played a
large role in perpetuating the persona of sex offenders as "uncontrollable
monsters." 20 When a particularly heinous sex crime occurs there is national
media coverage around the clock for weeks, sometimes months, following
the crime.121 Research conducted in the 1970s and 80s, in which researchers
118. See John Curran, Sex-offender Zones Assailed-Critics Say Ordinances Limiting Where
Offenders can Live Are Ineffective and too Broad, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 22, 2005, at BO1 (Brick
Township, New Jersey Mayor said that despite the impracticability of the residency restriction,
which effectively resulted in banishment, it was too difficult to vote no on ordinances relating to sex
offenders.); infra note 126 and accompanying text.
119. The widely held perception is that the vast majority of sex offenders will repeat their crimes.
However, according to research by the United States Department of Justice in association with the
Canadian Government, the sexual recidivism rates average "between 14% and 20% over 5-year
follow-up periods." Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Facts About Adult Sex
Offenders, http://www.atsa.com/ppOffenderFacts.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); see also Press
Release, Office of the Governor of the State of California, Governor Schwarzenegger Proposes
Toughest Sex Offender Laws in the History of the State of California (Aug. 16, 2005), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/1565/ (The press release quoted Assemblywoman Runner: "As a
legislator, mother and soon to be grandmother, I feel my most important job is to keep these
predators away from our children and within our sights." The sentiment is illustrative of the point
that despite the negative consequences or the unconstitutionality that may result, many are
legislating on emotion rather than reason.). It should be noted that The Sexual Predator Punishment
and Control Act, which was the subject of the press release, later became Proposition 83 on the
November 2006 ballot, and was passed with over 70% support. See Frank D. Russo, All California
Statewide Bonds Pass as Does Proposition 83 on Sex Offenders. Propositions 85 through 90 All
Fail, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS REPORT, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/
site/?q=archive/20061 1 &page=5.
120. No one would mean to suggest that people who commit violent crimes (whether sex crimes
or not) are not "evil" or a type of "monster." However, there exists a fallacy that just because a
perpetrator has committed a prior sex crime necessarily means that the person is uncontrollable or
will inevitably re-offend, which is the typical portrayal in the media. The fact is that the people who
commit sexual offenses are, perhaps surprisingly, a very heterogeneous group. Thus it becomes very
difficult to treat them all as possessing the same characteristics. Research suggests that sex
offenders who re-offend the most are pedophiles that molest young boys, and rapists of adult
women-with recidivism rates at 52% and 39% respectively. Association for the Treatment of
Sexual Abusers, supra note 119.
121. Criticism for the approach that media takes in reporting sex crimes and creating awareness
for sex offenders is prevalent. Brian Montopoli of the CBS News Public Eye Blog (formerly of the
Columbia Journalism Review) criticizes the Dateline NBC: How to Catch a Predator series because
he believes that as a business, NBC cares more about dramatic footage and favorable ratings than
about justice. See CBS News Public Eye Blog, Does "Dateline" Go too far to "Catch a Predator?",
Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2006/02/07/publiceyelentryl290135.shtml ("NBC is
first and foremost a business, and the producers' motives are not simply altruistic . . . . I find it
telling that this program has been remade and rernm so often. You could argue that NBC is just
making sure as many people as possible are aware predators are out there, but is it too much to think
that a little thing called 'ratings' might play a part as well?"). For more information regarding
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concluded that sex offenders would continue to re-offend because they were
unable to detect a difference in recidivism rates between sex offenders who
had undergone treatment and those who had not, is largely responsible for
shaping the media paradigm.12 2  However, the reality is much tamer.123
Notwithstanding the extensive media coverage of child abductions that result
in extreme violence, more modem research suggests that "less than 1% of all
sex crimes involve murder."l 24 Despite this reality, the legislative response
is too often fashioned to calm the fears and satisfy the demands of the
citizens the legislators serve.125  As such, the response is swift, but in its
expediency it falls short in weighing the potential negative side effects; notjust to offenders themselves, but also to our system of Constitutional justice
that our country holds tantamount.126
nationwide media coverage of sex crimes and the legislative response that it can generate see supra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
122. Lita Furby, Mark R. Weinrott & Lyn Blackshaw, Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105(1)
PSYCHOL. BULL 3, 3-30 (1989).
123. Furthermore, contrary to the myth that strangers pose the more serious danger, "the vast
majority of sexually abused children (80-90%) are molested by family members and close friends or
acquaintances." Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, supra note 119.
124. Id.
125. Adam Walsh Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). The Act's Declaration of Purpose states:
"In order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to
the vicious attacks by violent predators against the victims listed below, Congress in this Act
establishes a comprehensive national system for the registration of those offenders[.]" Id. The act
the goes on to list seventeen victims of sex crimes by name, ranging in ages from five to thirty-one
over a twenty-one year period from 1984-2005. Id. Only four of them were attacked by
perpetrators who were repeat or career offenders. Id. Some of the names, which received the most
media attention, include Megan Kanka ("Megan's Law"), Jessica Lunsford ("Jessica's Law"),
Elizabeth Smart (found alive), and Samantha Runnion; 5,500 mourners attended Samantha's funeral(she was five years old at the time of her murder). Id Clearly, the affects of such tragedy reach
thousands of people. The fact cannot be ignored that legislation like this Act is often fueled by the
public outcry for change. The difficult question is: do seventeen victims spread over twenty-one
years justify such a heavy-handed response, and if so is the response constitutional? See infra note
242 and accompanying text.
126. The mob mentality for justice by the public must be tempered by the reason, planning, and
protection of the government. It is without a doubt that sex offenders should be dealt with harshly.
However, many of the laws are so focused on the severity and swiftness of a response that will calm
the fears of the majority that they end up counterproductive to rehabilitation and restrict the
individual liberties of "this group" passed the point that is tolerable by the Constitution. See e.g.,Curran, supra note 118. Sex offenders living in Brick Township, New Jersey were prohibited from
living within 2,500 feet of all bus stops after they were included on the list in the residency
restriction statute. Id. There are more than 2,000 bus stops in the area, so the "measure effectively
bars offenders from living anywhere in the town." Id. Despite this result, Brick Mayor Joseph
Scarpelli believes that politically it is very difficult to vote no on an ordinance that deals with sex
offenders. Id Mayor Scarpelli continued, "I know they'll probably have a case that tests all these
ordinances, and there's a good possibility a lot will be thrown out as unconstitutional. But it makes a
town feel that they care about their children." Id.
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A. Panic Driven Legislation: Origins of Sex Offender Laws
The origins of sex offender regulations can be traced to perhaps the
most notorious sex crime ever committed.127 On January 15, 1947,
Elizabeth Short's mutilated and severed body was found in a vacant lot in
Los Angeles, California.12 8  One month later, California passed the first
registry legislation to aid law enforcement in the monitoring of convicted
rapists, child molesters, and other sexually aggressive "predators." 2 9
Between 1947 and the early 1990s few states had registration requirements
imposed on convicted sex offenders. 30
However, beginning in the 1990s, legislative bodies began to react to
highly publicized child abductions.13 ' First, in 1994, Congress passed the
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Act'3 2 ("Jacob Wetterling Act"), which "require[d] state implementation of a
sex-offender registration program or a 10 percent forfeiture of federal funds
for state and local law enforcement."' 33  "Most people assume that a
registered sex offender is someone who has sexually abused a child or
engaged in a violent sexual assault of an adult," however, many state
127. See Crime and Investigation Network, Elizabeth Short: The Black Dahlia,
http://www.crimeandinvestigation.co.uk/crime-files/elizabeth-short-the-black-dahlia/arrest.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010) ("In February 1947, as a direct result of the Short murder, California became
the first state requiring the registration of convicted sex offenders.").
128. Crime Library on truTV.com, The Black Dahlia Story: The Unsolved Murder of Elizabeth
Short, http://www.trutv.com/1ibrary/crime/notoriousmurders/famous/dahliaindex_1.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010); WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilBlackDahlia (last visited Feb. 20,
2010) (entry for "Black Dahlia"). Better known as "The Black Dahlia," Short's murder gripped the
public because of the brutality of the crime as well as sensational and sometimes inaccurate press
coverage. Id It was the largest investigation by the LAPD since the murder of twelve-year-old
Marion Parker, in 1927, and involved hundreds of officers borrowed from other law enforcement
agencies. Id The murder, which remains unsolved, "has been the source of widespread speculation
as well as several books and film adaptations." Id.
129. California Department of Justice, Megan's Law, Sex Offender Registration and Exclusion
Information, http://meganslaw.ca.gov/sexreg.aspx?lang-ENGLISH (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
130. Nat'l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Sex Offenders: History, http://www.missingkids
.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry-enUS&Pageld=30 3 2 (last visited Feb. 20,
2010) [hereinafter Sex Offender History].
13 1. See Anna Barvir, When Hysteria and Good Intentions Collide: Constitutional Considerations
of California's Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 679, 683 (2008)
("In response to a string of highly publicized murders and sexual assaults on children in the early
1990s, Congress contributed to the emerging national patchwork of sex offender laws ... aimed at
strengthening offender-monitoring procedures in every state."); see also Jan M. Chaiken, Foreward
to U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, at v
(1998), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdflNcsor.pdf.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).
133. Sex Offender History, supra note 130.
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registration laws require registration when an individual's "conduct did not
involve coercion or violence, and may have had little or no connection to
sex" at all.13 4  Then in 1996, on the heels of the brutal sexual assault and
murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka,'35 Congress again acted to amend
the Jacob Wetterling Act to include community notification when sex
offenders are released from prison.136  Today, every state including the
District of Columbia has sex offender registry laws.'37  Furthermore, as
many states continue to increase the reach of legislative regulations on sex
offenders, so too has the ferocity and necessity increased for those who wish
to challenge those expansions."3
B. The Road to Nowhere: The Failure ofExisting Challenges
Given that sex offenders are a disenfranchised group whose lobby is
neither large nor vocal,139 the courts more than ever have an enormous
134. See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-200(b) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 28.722, 750.455 (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.594, .595 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 40-39-202 to -203 (2006 & Supp. 2009); W. VA. CODE §§ 15-12-2, 61-8-6 to -7 (2009). The five
states require registration for adult prostitution-related offenses and are distinct from prostitution
offenses relating to children. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14 at section V, n. 108. "At
least 39 states require persons to register as sex offenders for prostitute-related offenses against
children." Id. "At least 13 states require registration for public urination," of which two limit
registration to the act committed in view of a minor; and "[a]t least 29 states require registration for
consensual sex between teenagers." Id.
135. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
136. Sex Offender History, supra note 130. The law, known as "Megan's Law," mandates the
creation of state notification systems, including the creation of an Internet resource that contains the
names and locations of newly released offenders; but leaves the specific methods and policies to the
discretion of the States. Id.
137. Id.
138. New laws affecting sex offenders come with a "scarlet" label, a visual marker, which
historically has led to contempt and scorn prior to full and complete investigation. See Jennifer
Rosenberg, The Yellow Star, ABOUT.COM, http://historyl 900s.about.com/od/holocaust/a/
yellowstar.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (Jews in Nazi Germany forced to wear a yellow star on
their clothing designating them as Jewish, subjecting them to persecution, despite not being guilty of
any crime); see also infra note 178 and accompanying text. For other examples of "scarlet letter"
laws see S.B. 1163, 2007-08 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2008) (This California bill is currently in
the California Senate; last action Feb. 14, 2008. If passed, the bill will prohibit all sex offenders who
are subject to the registration requirement from driving a vehicle unless it is displaying a specially
issued license plate or sticker that indicates their status as a registered sex offender.); H.B. 217 126th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 2005-06 (Ohio 2006). Many state legislatures have passed scarlet letter
laws intended to restrict the movement of registered sex offenders on Halloween. See e.g., Wendy
Koch, Halloween Restrictions Put On Sex Offenders, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2008, at 3A, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-29-halloweenN.htm (discussing laws from Indiana,
Maryland, Missouri, and New Mexico which require convicted sex offenders to post signs at their
homes telling trick-or-treaters to stay away or saying "No candy at this residence"). For a picture of
the sign see Tom LoBianco, Pumpkin Symbol Marks Sex Offenders' Homes, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2008, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/15/pumpkin-marks-sex-offend
ers-homes/.
139. Cal. Dep't of Corrs. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 522 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The
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responsibility to protect their constitutional guarantees. Notwithstanding
this responsibility, with few exceptions judges in courts of various state and
federal jurisdictions have overwhelmingly upheld sex offender laws,
rejecting challenges based on procedural due process,140 equal protection, 14 1
cruel and unusual punishment,142  banishment,143 ex post facto, 4 and
arguments that such laws violate fundamental rights, including the right to
privacy.145  Existing constitutional challenges are most commonly raised in
the context of registration, community notification laws, and, more recently,
residency restrictions.
First, despite the research that suggests community notification schemes
are fatally flawed,146 in 2003 the United States Supreme Court upheld the
Alaska 47  and Connecticut 48 state notification laws.149  The specific
danger of legislative overreaching against which the [Constitution] protects is particularly acute
when the target of the legislation is a narrow group as unpopular (to put it mildly) as multiple
murderers."). It is easy to compare esteem in the minds of others for multiple murders to that of
multiple offense sex offenders, especially those that involve children or that result in murder.
140. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
141. See Wright v. Iowa Dep't of Corrs., 747 N.W.2d 213, 216-17 (Iowa 2008) (rejecting equal
protection argument because the residency restrictions applied equally to all sex offenders and only
needed to satisfy a rational-basis analysis). Contra People v. Hofsheier, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Ct.
App. 2004), overruled by 129 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2006) (holding that requiring an individual convicted of
engaging in oral copulation with a minor under the age of 18 is a violation of equal protection if the
participants are within three years of each other, because adolescents of the same age difference who
engage in consensual intercourse do not trigger the registration). Explaining its rationale the Court
stated that it perceived "no reason why the Legislature would conclude that persons who are
convicted of voluntary oral copulation with adolescents 16 to 17 years old, as opposed to those who
are convicted of voluntary intercourse with adolescents in that same age group, constitute a class of
'particularly incorrigible offenders' . . . who require lifetime surveillance as sex offenders."
Hofsheier, 129 P.3d at 42; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 288(a)(b)(1), 261.5
142. See People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
143. See Wright, 747 N.W.2d at 218 (Iowa Supreme Court dismissing the contention without a
scintilla of analysis).
144. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); infra note 147 and accompanying text.
145. See A.A. ex rel M.M. v. New Jersey, 341 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejected registrant's
privacy challenge because purpose of the registration statute was not to humiliate); see also Byron
M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding information released to the
media and the public under registration statutes is not an invasion of privacy because it was not
shown that the legislative intent of the statute precluded dissemination of certain information to the
media regarding high-risk sex offenders and plaintiff was unable to demonstrate irreparable hapn).
146. See infra Part VI.
147. Smith, 538 U.S. at 84 (upholding Alaska's version of Megan's law against the constitutional
challenge that the registration law constituted an ex post facto law). In Smith, the Court reviewed an
argument that because Alaska's sex offender law applied to sex offenders who committed acts prior
to the enactment of the statute it was unconstitutional. Id. at 90-93. In a six-to-three opinion written
by Justice Kennedy, the Court rejected that argument, finding that the law was designed to protect
the public from sex offenders rather than to punish sex offenders themselves. Id. at 103-04. The
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constitutional issues raised in the cases differed, but in both cases the Court
gave little weight to the shaming and stigma that inevitably and necessarily
accompany community notification, and further overlooked the
unnecessarily broad scope of the statutes with respect to both who is
required to register and who may access the registry.so Lower courts have
similarly upheld registration requirements stating that the rights of privacy at
issue are not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition[] [nor]
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""' Indicative that a new challenge
is needed is the fact that courts generally review registration and community
notification statutes under a rational basis standard because the rights at
issue are not considered fundamental to one's constitutionally protected
interests, and because sex offenders are not classified as a suspect group.152
Court found that the Ex Post Facto Clause only applied to laws that were punitive in nature. Id.; see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
148. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (holding that Connecticut's version of
Megan's Law does not deprive sex offenders of procedural due process of law). In Connecticut, a
unanimous Court rejected an argument that sex offenders were denied procedural due process
because they were not afforded an opportunity to determine whether they were dangerous to the
public. Id. at 6. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, found that the sex offenders were not
entitled to a hearing about their dangerousness because the law applied to all convicted sex offenders
rather than only those who are considered dangerous, and thus a sex offender's propensity for danger
was not an issue of consequence under Connecticut's law. Id. at 7-8.
149. See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text. Although the Court's decisions in 2003
strongly indicate that the Court was inclined to uphold Megan's Law, the Court did not address
several key issues, such as whether these sex offender laws violate the offenders' substantive due
process or equal protection rights. Id The Court has declined to review any of the sex offender
cases that have come before it since, including a challenge to the Iowa residency restrictions law that
prevents sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of parks or other places where children might be
expected to congregate. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
150. Smith, 538 U.S. at 100-01.
151. Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2005). "[A] state's publication of truthful
information that is already available to the public does not infringe the fundamental constitutional
rights of liberty and privacy." Id. at 1345.
152. Id. at 1345-46. The rational basis standard is the lowest level of scrutiny applied by courts
deciding constitutional issues through judicial review. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 773
(E.D. Mo. 1994). The rational basis standard requires that governmental action be "rationally
related" to a "legitimate" government interest. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183 (1980).
Under this very deferential standard of review courts begin with a strong presumption that the law or
policy under review is valid. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993). The
burden of proof is on the party making the challenge to show that the law or policy is
unconstitutional. Id. To meet this burden, the party must demonstrate that the law or policy does
not have a rational basis. Id. This is a difficult to prove for two reasons: first, because a court can
usually find some reasonable ground for sustaining the constitutionality of the challenged law or
policy; and second, because the test gives great deference to the legislative branch. Id. I would
think it unwise, unpopular, and unsuccessful to advance an argument for making sex offenders a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, thereby elevating the level of scrutiny by which a court would be
forced to review sex offender legislation. However, a bill of attainder challenge is nonetheless
important because the test for bill of attainder is not whether a legislature has a legitimate purpose,
but whether in its pursuit of such legitimate ends the means it chooses either intentionally punishes
or inadvertently results in punishment. See infra Part V.B. This additional level of analysis is a
slightly more burdensome hurdle that the legislature must clear. Whereas the rational basis review
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Next, among the most controversial of sex offender laws, residency
restrictions 53 are highly criticized for failing to reach their purported public
safety purpose154 and creating a litany of unintended consequences.'55 Many
of the restrictions work in effect to banish sex offenders from the
community.'56  Despite the slippery constitutional slope on which this type
only requires a finding of a legitimate legislative purpose and further allows a court to create such
legitimate purpose whether one exists or not, the bill of attainder analysis, in contrast, does not
provide for such judicial invention. See VIKRAM D. AMAR, WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D.
VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 765-69 (13th ed. 2009).
153. There are nineteen states with residency restrictions that are not a condition of probation,
parole, or supervision: Delaware; Alabama Arkansas; Florida; Georgia; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana;
Iowa; Kentucky; Louisiana; Michigan; Mississippi; Missouri; Ohio; Oklahoma; South Dakota;
Tennessee; and Virginia. Eight states have a residence restriction as a condition of probation, parole,
or supervision: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.07(F) (2006); California, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 3003(g) (West 2006); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 947.1405(7)(a)(2), 948.30(l)(b) (West
2006 & Supp. 2010); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 1l-13-3-4(g)(2)(B), 35-38-2-2.2(2) (West 2004);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:538(D)(1)(c) (2005); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642(1)(a)
(2006); Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006); and West Virginia, W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 62-12-26(b) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2009).
154. The research continues to point to residency restrictions as being ineffective to cut down
recidivism. Paula Reed Ward, Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders Popular, but Ineffective,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 26, 2008, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/08300/922948-85.stm. "Even as prosecutors, criminal justice researchers and child
advocates say they don't work, parents and legislators continue to push for the tough laws." Id.; see
also JILL S. LEVENSON, SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS: A REPORT TO THE FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE 2, Oct. 2005, available at http://www.nacdl.org/sl docs.nsf/issues/ sexoffender_
attachments/$FILE/LevinsonFL.pdf (noting that despite public and political support there is no
concrete evidence that proximity to schools increases recidivism among sex offenders).
155. The occurrence of homelessness of paroled sex offenders has skyrocketed due to the
residency restrictions limiting where sex offenders can live. See Michael Rothfeld, Homeless Sex
Offenders on Parole Jumps Sharply, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at B2, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-briefsl 9-2008decl 9,0,2571906.story. Proposition 83,
California's version of Jessica's Law, prohibits sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of
schools and parks were children regularly gather. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West 2007)
(codifying California Ballot Initiative Proposition 83, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/
vig_06/generalo06/pdf/proposition_83/entireprop83.pdf). When the Sex Offender Management
Board released a report looking at Proposition 83's "effect on housing for all sex offenders,
including those not on parole" and "against whom the [residency] law has not generally been
enforced," the Board found a sixty percent increase of homelessness. Rothfeld, supra. The Board's
report stated: "Common sense leads to the conclusion that a community cannot be safer when sex
offenders are homeless," and in further support cited "research concluding that unstable housing [is
counterproductive to rehabilitation and] can lead to recidivism." Id. In response to the Board's
report, the California governor's office said that Governor Schwarzenegger still "strongly supports
Jessica's Law, [however,] all involved concede [it] needs fine-tuning." Id.
156. Despite being cloaked in protective, public safety intent, banishment is the desired goal of
these laws. Jason Garcia, Legislator Seeks Statewide Predator Law, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 2005,
at 12B (quoting Rep. Susan Goldstein who introduced a bill in the Florida legislature to increase the
residence restrictions from 1,000 to 2,500 feet and whose ultimate goal was to "get these people out
of our neighborhoods and hopefully out of our state"). In Georgia, where the laws are some of the
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of restriction resides, federal and state courts who have ruled on such
restrictions have, for the most part, upheld these laws against challenges that
the restrictions are unconstitutionally overbroad. and vague,'18 violate
substantive due process rights to housing,' 59 violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
against retroactive punishment,160 and violate the Eighth Amendment's ban
most strict, Georgia House Majority leader Jerry Keen, the chief sponsor of 2006 Georgia House Bill
1059, stated:
'We want those people running away from Georgia. Given the toughest laws here, we
think a lot of people could move to another state... . If it becomes too onerous and too
inconvenient, they just may want to live somewhere else. And I don't care where, as
long as it's not in Georgia.'
Whitaker v. Perdue Complaint, supra notel5, at 23. There was an amendment to S.B. I to narrow
the holding in Mann, which allows offenders to stay in their homes or jobs if they have lived or
worked there prior to July 1, 2006, but the intent is very much to drive sex offenders out of the state.
See infra note 158 and accompanying text. That intent is further echoed in Rep. Keen's statements
in the house chambers where he said:
If someone did something now to my grandchildren . . . [t]hose are the people we are
trying to get off the streets of this state, and those are the people that we are going to send
a message to that if you have a propensity to that crime perhaps you need to move to
another state.
Statement by Rep. Keen to Rep. Roger Bruce, House Debate on H.B. 1059, House Internet
Broadcasts (Feb. 2, 2006), available at http://www.georgia.gov/00/article/ 0,2086,4802_6107103
47120020,00.html; see also Georgia's New Sex Offender Law Nixed, GWINNETT DAILY ONLINE,
July 3, 2006, http://www.gwinnettdailyonline.com/GDP/archive/articlel9EE2C8F45E54FOC972
EOBAE97E39C86.asp (quoting Rep. Keen's remarks that the law would be an "inconvenience," but
urging that "most folks would agree this is a good thing"). Notwithstanding the desire of legislatures
to push sex offenders out of their respective states, the laws create practical problems because many
who are still on probation or parole cannot legally leave the state until they have gone through a
lengthy and tedious application process to transfer their supervision to another state; in the meantime
they are forced on to the streets and underground, only exacerbating the difficulty of monitoring of
such individuals. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
157. People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
158. Mann v. State ("Mann I"), 603 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Ga. 2004); see Mann v. Georgia Dep't of
Corrs. ("Mann II"), 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007) (declaring GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (2008), a
portion of Georgia's residency restriction statute, unconstitutional as a violation of state and federal
takings clauses). The takings clause prohibits the government from physically taking someone's
property for public use or placing regulations on it that result in the inability to use the land for its
intended purpose, without just compensation for deprivation of the person's protected property
interest. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Mr. Mann, a person on the registry, purchased a home in an
area that was originally not within 1,000 feet of a prohibited location. Mann II, 653 S.E.2d at 741-
42. Later, two child-care centers opened within 1,000 feet of his home. Id. at 742. As a result, law
enforcement authorities ordered him to move. Id After the Georgia Supreme Court found the
residency restrictions unconstitutional, an amendment to section 42-1-15 was passed to try and
narrow and clarify the Georgia Supreme Court's decision. See S.B.1, 2007-08 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2008). The bill that became law July 1, 2008, reinstated all residency and employment
restrictions that were in place before the Mann II decision with two exceptions: a homeowner who
has established ownership prior to July 1, 2006, will not be required to move if one of the
enumerated places that are statutorily prohibited moves within 1,000 feet of the offender's residence;
and a person employed at a certain location will not be required to change employment if he or she
was employed prior to July 1, 2006. Id. (codified in GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-1-15 (2008)).
159. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 710 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 776-77.
160. Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1041-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Thompson v. State, 603
S.E.2d 233, 234-36 (Ga. 2004); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 85 (2003).
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on cruel and unusual punishment.16 ' Not surprisingly, no court applying a
rational basis review has held that residency restrictions are an unreasonable
means of achieving the state's legitimate purpose of protecting children.162
However, it is disturbing that in past challenges sex offenders have pointed
to the lack of evidence that the exclusion zones enhance children's safety, 63
and courts in response have conceded that the efficacy of the restrictions is
unproven, yet continue to uphold the restrictions.16 There is a clear
disconnect between the stated purpose of the legislation affecting sex
offenders and the actual results.'16  It appears that many lawmakers are
legislating without sound reason, as if the courts will step in if they go too
far. However, courts in this area are instead stepping aside and granting
legislatures broad discretion.166 The result of this deference is that existing
constitutional challenges are inadequate and ineffective to handle the poorly
designed and overly oppressive legislation affecting sex offenders.
V. A NEW DIRECTION: APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF ATTAINDER
ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION
From a society whose punishment for commission of a felony was
death, 67  our society has evolved to reflect our increased collective
161. SeeLeroy, 828 N.E. 2d at 784.
162. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 716 ("[W]e are not persuaded that the means selected to pursue the
State's legitimate interest are without rational basis."); see also Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 777 ("[W]e
conclude that . .. prohibiting child sex offenders from living within 500 feet of a playground ...
bears a reasonable relationship to the goal of protecting children.").
163. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d, at 714 ("[Petitioners] contend ... that the statute is irrational
because there is no scientific study that supports the legislature's conclusion that excluding sex
offenders from residing within 2000 feet of a school or child care facility is likely to enhance the
safety of children.").
164. Id. (describing the effectiveness of sex offender residency statutes as "an area where precise
statistical data is unavailable and human behavior is necessarily unpredictable"); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d
at 777 ("[T]he record is bare of any statistics or research correlating residency distance with sex
offenses."); see also supra note 154. Dr. Levenson, a Lynn University professor who has studied
sex crime policy for almost a decade, says that because restrictions also limit access to family,
affordable housing, employment, and treatment programs, the result of the restrictions is counter to
what legislators had intended. LEVENSON, supra note 154, at 5. The reality is "[c]riminal offenders
who have stable housing, stable employment and support systems in their lives . . . are less likely to
go on and commit new crimes." Ward, supra note 154.
165. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 715 ("The legislature is institutionally equipped to weigh the
benefits and burdens of various distances . . . ."); Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 776-77 ("[T]he state has
broad powers ... to avert potentially dangerous situations.").
167. NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Felony (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010) (entry for "Felony"). "[W]hen the British and American legal systems
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sophistication and social progress. The prohibition of bills of attainder has
also progressed to include more than just capital sentences.168  Part of the
history that has remained is the continued focus on "legislative enactments
that 'set[] a note of infamy' on the persons to whom the statute applies."l 69
The reputational tarnish of being labeled a felon will no doubt make normal
life challenging. 70 However, add to it the additional classification as a sex
offender and not only does it damage one's pecuniary opportunities, but it
also harms one's ability to have interpersonal or intimate relationships.' 7'
Therefore, it should be with great care and due caution that we designate a
person with such a destructive label. It is important to distinguish between a
narrowly constructed sex offender registration system designed to protect the
public, and hastily crafted legislation that casts its net so wide that it
captures offenders whose predatory behavior or criminal intent was never
proven.172 A successful challenge to the latter through the Bill of Attainder
Clause would serve what this country was built to preserve and protect-
Justice.
In order for a legislative act to be struck down as a prohibited bill of
attainder, it must satisfy the Supreme Court's two-part inquiry: (1) whether
the act specifically names or identifies an individual or group; and (2)
whether the act inflicts punishment within the meaning of the Bill of
Attainder Clause.173
divorced in 1776, felonies were crimes for which the punishment was .. . death . . . ." Id.
168. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
169. Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 453-54 (1965) (holding that a statute is not a bill of attainder where it "incorporates
no judgment censuring or condemning any man or group of men")).
170. Most if not all job applications ask applicants whether they have been convicted of a felony
and if so to describe the circumstances surrounding all convictions. See, e.g., Book Byte Application
for Employment, http://www.bookbyte.com/employment/forns/bbapplication.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2010). Aside from the disclosure requirement there is normally language that suggests a person
would not be automatically disqualified from employment on the basis of a felony conviction, but
that each conviction would be evaluated individually on its own merits, and that nondisclosure of a
conviction would result in automatic disqualification from consideration or termination from
employment. Id Despite such language, common sense dictates that a felon has a more difficult
time getting certain employment than someone of equal qualifications without the conviction.
171. See supra note 170; Henry, supra note 1 (As a sex offender Wendy has endured many
hardships in her personal life. She filed for federal disability citing sleep apnea and a severe weight
problem. Speaking about being subjected to the residency restrictions in Georgia Wendy said,
"[t]his is causing a lot of problems in my marriage. My husband can't quit his job. What are we
supposed to do, separate? I really don't know what I'll do. I'm absolutely at wit's end."). To be
clear, the persons who commit sex crimes have, by their actions and in conjunction with the courts,
placed themselves squarely within such an unattractive group.
172. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (Supp. 2009) and IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.1 (West
2003) (neither statute distinguishes between different sex offenders based on their committed
offense), with California Proposition 83 codified in CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (2009) (identifying
classification of sex offenders based on the offense committed and perceived threat to society in the
future).
173. See Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977).
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A. Application of the Specificity Requirement
Generally, there is support in case law to analogize prior group
classifications that resulted in findings of bills of attainder to certain types of
restrictions that are placed on sex offenders as a class. In Brown, the Court
found that section 504 inflicted "its deprivation upon the members of a
political group thought to present a threat to the national security," 74 and,
therefore, members of the unpopular Communist party were an easily
identifiable group.!75  While the specificity requirement had not yet been
articulated, the Court's findings in Brown are consistent with a finding of
specificity.' 6  Sex offenders as a group are analogous to Communists for
two main reasons:' 77 first, society and, by extension, legislators consider
both groups undesirable and a threat to public safety;' 8 and second, much of
the legislation does not enumerate which characteristics it is trying to avoid
but subjects all who are convicted of any "sex crime" to bear the same
174. Brown, 381 U.S. at 453.
175. Congress did not enumerate characteristics that it wished to eliminate from government
service but identified the group as whole, which constituted prohibited legislative fact finding.
Brown, 381 U.S. at 456; see also id at 464 (White, J., dissenting) ("The legislature may focus on a
particular group or class only when ... it is common knowledge that all, not just some, members of
the group possess the feared characteristics and thus such legislative designation would require no
legislative fact-finding about individuals.").
176. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 461 (finding that the Act was not exempted from being a bill of
attainder just because it inflicted its deprivation "upon the membership of [a group] rather than upon
a list of named individuals").
177. Admittedly, members of the Communist Party who were singled out by Congress were never
granted a judicial trial, and are thus distinguishable from sex offenders who have been tried and
convicted criminally. See Part C of this section for the full discussion.
178. Compare American Masters, Arthur Miller, McCarthyism, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/
americanmasters/episodes/arthur-miller/mccarthyism/484/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (Senator
Joseph McCarthy publicly accused hundreds, if not thousands, of people of being communists or
communist sympathizers. Though many of the allegations were proven untrue, the process saw
many getting their passports taken away, while others were jailed for refusing to give the names of
other communists. "The trials, which were well publicized, could often destroy a career with a
single unsubstantiated accusation." His over-zealous campaigning ushered in one of the most
repressive times in 20th-century American politics. Today, "McCarthyism has entered American
speech as a general term for . . . using accusations of disloyalty to discredit an opponent [and]
subverting civil rights in the name of national security."), and Brown, 381 U.S. at 450 (Communists
were likely to "initiate political strikes" against the United States Government), with President
William J. Clinton, Regarding the Passage of Megan's Law (radio broadcast Aug. 24, 1996)
("Nothing is more threatening to our families and communities and more destructive of our basic
values than sex offenders who victimize children and families. Study after study tells us that they
often repeat the same crimes. That's why we have to stop sex offenders before they commit their
next crime, to make our children safe and give their parents piece [sic] of mind."), and supra note 15
(discussing how overly-broad the legislation and the destructiveness in individual's lives as a result
of such legislative irresponsibility).
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burden.'79  Furthermore, the position that legislation directed at sex
offenders will satisfy the specificity requirement is strengthened because,
unlike members of a political party, who could, if desired, escape the
detriments of party affiliation, a sex offender cannot escape his or her
classification.180 Factoring in escapability in this context, the trapping nature
of one's sex offender status more closely resembles the Cummings/Garland
scenario, than that of Selective Service.'81
Additionally, assuming arguendo that those who would be critical of sex
offenders meeting the specificity requirement base their objection on Nixon,
where the Court found it possible to create a legitimate class when there was
unilateral and voluntary action, their objection can be distinguished.182  The
creation of a legitimate "sex offender class" does not result when a person
commits a crime of a sexual nature because, unlike Nixon who entered into
the agreement to destroy presidential materials willingly and knowingly,
many offenders commit acts that they do not know are sex crimes that would
subject them to registration and other sex offender requirements.183
Notwithstanding the firmly established principle in criminal law that
ignorance or mistake of law does not constitute an excuse for the crime, 184
the Nixon Court by continuing their analysis even after finding a marginally
met specificity prong impliedly created an exception for the bill of attainder
inquiry.'85 As a result, the specificity prong is likely satisfied; therefore, the
179. See supra notes 134, 172 and accompanying text; see also supra note 175. Interestingly, this
is often why the equal protection argument fails. See supra note 141 (This is demonstrative of the
"catch-22" that exists in the current lawmaking scheme. Because of the complexity and individual
intricacies within this area of the law, in order to survive an equal protection challenge, the
legislation must apply equally; but by applying equally it unjustifiably includes individuals who
neither are nor ever were a threat to public safety.). For more on the Equal Protection Clause see
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
180. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Escapability, though not determinative, is a
probative factor in the Court's analysis in Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research
Group, 468 U.S. 841, 850-51 (1984).
181. Compare Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 288 (1866) (mandating that before
petitioner could resume his profession he had to take an oath which was impossible for him to
subscribe to honestly), with Selective Serv., 468 U.S at 850-51 (men who had their federal aid
money withdrawn for failure to register with the selective service could escape the deprivation by
simply registering late without penalty). The factor of escapability has been considered for both the
specificity purpose and the punitive inquiry for the purpose of the bill of attainder analysis. Brown,
381 U.S. at 457 n.32. In Douds, the Court considered it as probative of whether the statute was
punitive in nature, whereas the Court in Subversive Activities Control Board, applied the factor for a
specificity purpose. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
184. DAVID C. BRODY ET AL., CRIMINAL LAw 295-96 (2001).
185. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (Perhaps with guilt already decided, the Nixon
Court thought the bill of attainder safeguard was important enough and the punishment prong
difficult to satisfy on its own, that is was not unwise to allow even a marginal group through to the
latter analysis.). Furthermore, as a matter of policy, certain sex offenders should be allowed to prove
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success of the constitutional challenge turns on whether the legislature seeks
to inflict, or in fact does inflict, punishment.'86
B. The Last Hurdle: Meeting One of the Supreme Court Tests for
Punishment
The punitive nature of a legislative enactment can be found according to
one of three tests:'87 historical,'88 functional,'"9 or motivational.'90 To begin,
the Nixon Court relied on the "infamous history" of bills of attainder to flesh
out the "deprivations and disabilities so disproportionately severe and so
inappropriate to non-punitive ends that they unquestionably ... fall within
the proscription of [the Bill of Attainder Clause]." 9' Another legislative
punishment that has become part of the American bill of attainder
jurisprudence is legislative bars on participation in specified employment or
professions.192 "A statutory enactment that imposes any [such] sanctions on
identifiable individuals would be immediately constitutionally suspect."' 9 3
Generally "scarlet letter" laws,194 if enacted, along with current
residency and employment restrictions inflict three of the most traditional
punitive intent because otherwise they are subject to such a disproportionately severe legislative
response for a "victimless" crime (e.g., a consensual sex act with a peer who is under the age of
consent; adult-adult prostitution). See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. "Since virtually all legislation operates by
identifying the characteristics of the class to be benefited or burdened, it is not clear that the
specificity requirement retains any real bite." BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 63 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
187. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court in Brown clearly stated
the proposition that punishment can serve several purposes. Brown, 381 U.S. at 458.
188. To meet the historical test, the punishment inflicted by the legislative act must be one that
has historically been associated with bills of attainder, or more often in this country, bills of pains
and penalties. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
189. The functional test asks whether the type and severity of burdens imposed by the law at issue
can be reasonably said to further any non-punitive legislative purposes. See supra notes 106-110
and accompanying text.
190. The motivational test is an inquiry in to the legislative record (including legislative
committee hearings and debates) to see if there is evidence of a legislative intent to punish. See
supra notes 111-115. Additionally, the Lovett Court's investigation into the legislative background
going back some eight years prior to when it heard that case is illustrative of the importance of the
surrounding context and circumstances to the analysis of punitive intent of the legislative act at
issue. See supra Part III.B and notes 65, 67 and accompanying text.
191. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977).
192. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984).
193. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473.
194. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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punishments under bills of attainder, other than death: the use of shame, a
ban against practicing a profession, and banishment.195 First, most sex
offenders are subject to tremendous embarrassment and shame that is
associated with meeting the legislative requirements for sex offenders,
whether the sentiment flows from the community being notified when they
enter a new area or from having a specially issued license plate.196
Moreover, along with residency restrictions several states and local
communities have enacted employment restrictions intended to keep sex
offenders away from schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds, public
swimming pools, video arcades, recreation centers, and public athletic
fields.197 Everyone would agree that there is a rational basis for prohibiting
a child offender from employment at many of these places because most sex
offenses committed against children are committed by individuals who have
a prior relationship with their victims.'98 However, the ban on employment
extends out to create a zone around the forbidden areas, working in effect to
prohibit sex offenders from engaging in many professions. 99 Furthermore,
sex offender residency restrictions, both intentionally and sometimes
unintentionally, have largely resulted in banishment from the community.200
Case law indicates that to meet the historical test the primary focus is on the
resulting punishment, not the intent of the legislature, which is only
195. See generally Part II (stating the idea that bills of attainder work to "taint" a person, often so
that the community would know of one's transgressions against the Crown, making death and
forfeiture of lands seemingly more justified); supra note 169 and accompanying text (standing for
the notion that part of a bill of attainder is a sense of community condemnation); supra note 36 and
accompanying text (banishment was a common and effective punishment because of the shame that
was associated with it).
196. See Part I and Part IV.B.
197. ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a), (g) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
775.21(10)(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(c)(l)-(2) (Supp. 2009); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-8327(1) (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-10(b) (West 2006); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 28.733(f), 28.734(l)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §
589(A) (West 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-370.4(A) (2009).
198. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS I (2000),
available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.pdf.
199. Jobs that require workers to work at new locations on a regular basis such as plumbers,
electricians, and construction are now off-limits to convicted sex offenders because of the risk of
inadvertently entering the restricted zones. Downtown areas, the place of business of many white-
collar workers, are also often off-limits to prior offenders because with just one daycare facility
located on one floor of a high-rise building an entire city block could be forbidden. The practical
effect of the restrictions is sex offenders will be relegated to agricultural work on the outskirts of the
community. If that is not feasible, then unemployment is the natural consequence of these
restrictions.
200. See Part IV.B supra note 156 and accompanying text; Henry, supra note I (House Majority
Leader Jerry Keen, who sponsored Georgia's residency restriction law, did not attempt to conceal
the intended impact the law would have on sex offenders; in speaking to the Senate committee, he
said, "Candidly, senators, they will in many cases have to move to another state."). Thus, the
historical test for punishment would be satisfied.
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tangentially implicated.20 ' Therefore, the historical test is likely met in most
situations.
Next, application of the functional test requires some interpretation of its
linchpin-a finding of a non-punitive legislative purpose.202 Such legitimate
non-punitive goals have included: encouraging draft registration,203
guaranteeing the availability of evidence at criminal trials, 204 preserving
historical records, 205 and encouraging competition in formerly monopolized
markets.206 The test requires one to establish that the legislature's action
constitutes punishment and not merely the legitimate regulation of
conduct.207  However, "where there exists a significant imbalance between
the magnitude of the burden imposed and purported nonpunitive purpose,"
another way to disprove non-punitive purpose is through a showing that
"less burdensome alternatives" are available.208
201. See Bellsouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting the analysis from
Brown, distinguishing Agnew because the act at issue "incorporat[ed] no judgment censuring or
condemning any man or group of men," to show that the result is the mainstay of the analysis and
intent is only slightly involved).
202. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (finding that law that conditioned financial aid
benefits on draft registration had a legitimate legislative purpose).
204. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (preservation of evidence for use in criminal trials
was "fair exercise of Congress' responsibility to the 'due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice"'); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 477 (1977).
205. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
206. See BellSouth, 162 F.3d at 688-90 (holding that Congress had a legitimate non-punitive
purpose in conditioning telephone company's entrance into long distance markets on opening of
local markets to competition).
207. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 476 n.40 (Moreover, it is established that "punishment is not restricted
purely to retribution for past events, but may include inflicting deprivation on some blameworthy or
tainted individual in order to prevent his future misconduct.").
208. Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Seariver Mar. Fin.
Holdings v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2002) (considering whether there existed any
less burdensome alternatives by which the legislature could have achieved its purpose). Sex
offender statutes, often written in haste to meet the public call to action, are not carefully tailored or
narrow enough to be effective. See Pamela A. MacLean, Challenges Grow Over Sex Offender Laws,
NAT'L LAW J., June 9, 2008, available at http://www.justiceflorida.com/2008/06/articles/florida-
criminal-lawyer-ronald/national-law-joural-challenges-grow-over-sex-offender-laws/ (discussing
how sex offender legislation gets passed quickly without considering better alternatives); see also
infra note 242 and accompanying text. The courts' discussion of less burdensome alternatives
further strengthens the proposition that the bill of attainder analysis is more stringent, resembling a
higher level of scrutiny, than that of a normal rational basis review that other constitutional
challenges have been held to in the sex offender context. See supra note 152 and accompanying
text.
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The challenge in the sex offender context is that the law in this area is
fueled by media attention and public opinion.209 This moves the law very
quickly, and most times legislative bodies can put forth a very colorable
non-punitive purpose without having to show that the non-punitive purpose
can be achieved by the enactment. 2 10  Nevertheless, it is still possible to
reach a favorable finding of punishment under the functional test.21  A
copious amount of recent and reliable research has exposed that residency
and employment restrictions especially have failed to meet their proposed
legitimate goals, 2 12 and as such, should remove the impediment for finding
that punishment was in fact its ultimate aim.213 It would be hard to imagine
that legislation that continued to inflict deprivations on people would remain
immune from a bill of attainder challenge once the legitimate purpose relied
upon when putting it forth was shown to be ineffective.2 4
Lastly, the motivational test's inquiry centers on legislative intent as
evidenced by the legislative record, "timing of the legislation, as well as
specific aspects of the text or structure of the disputed legislation." 2 15 Intent
to punish does not need to be express through a formal announcement in a
209. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
210. Id. One example of the problem is registration and GPS monitoring of the most dangerous
sex offenders. GPS monitoring would serve a legitimate regulatory function; however, such a
scenario normally does not occur because the extremely violent sex offenders do not get released
from prison and thus are not subject to these legitimate regulatory safeguards.
211. This is especially true given that the nonpunitive aims must be "sufficiently clear and
convincing" before a court will uphold a disputed statute against a bill of attainder challenge.
BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 686.
212. The most recent research on the subject of sex offenders tends to point to the conclusion that
many of the sex offender regulations, especially those restricting where sex offenders can live and
work, have no affect on recidivism rates, and actually do more harm than good because sex
offenders cannot achieve any level of stability. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text;
see also infra note 237 and accompanying text. It should be significant that research shows the
legislation is not working to serve its ends. In light of that fact, the severity of the burdens which sex
offenders remain subject to are unduly disproportionate to the purported non-punitive purpose of the
enactment, and what would be left should be a bill of attainder.
213. See Nixon, 433 U.S at 476 ("Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, it is
reasonable to conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the
purpose of the decisionmakers.").
214. See Foretich, 351 F.3d at 1221 ("[W]here there exists a significant imbalance between the
magnitude of the burden imposed and purported nonpunitive purpose, the statute cannot reasonably
be said to further nonpunitive purposes."); see also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pataki, 292
F.3d 338, 354 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding a statute to be a bill of attainder where "the legislature piled
on a burden that was obviously disproportionate to the harm caused").
215. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 855 n.14(1984) (stating that a court must inspect legislation for a congressional purpose to "encroach[] on thejudicial function of punishing an individual for blameworthy offenses"). The motivational test is not
determinative in the absence of "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent." Flemming v. Nestor,
363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960); see also BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 690 ("'Several isolated statements' are
not sufficient to evince punitive intent[,]" and cannot render a statute a bill of attainder without any
other indicia of punishment. (quoting Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 856 n. 15)).
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legislative hearing.2 16 However, in the context of sex offender regulations,
the legislative records often are replete with statements similar to that of one
legislator who expressed: "[s]ex offenders are the most reviled people in
society ... [;] [t]hey're one step above terrorists; there's no political
downside to cracking down on these folks."217 Many of the legislative
statements in the current milieu regarding sex offenders reflect the same
sentiments of contempt and scorn that were held against Communists in the
United States during the McCarthy era;218 the Court determined that many of
those statutes were punitive and prohibited by the Bill of Attainder
Clause.219
Furthermore, the test seeks to address "the fear that the legislature, in
seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it expedient
openly to assume the mantle of judge-or, worse still, lynch mob." 220 The
fear is especially real because sex offenders incite the passions and outrage
of the public. 22' For legislators in highly publicized areas of law, "the
promulgation of criminal laws affords an irresistible chance to align
themselves with the victims of crime and against the criminal element,
[which is] a compelling political symmetry accentuated in modem times by
the soundbite imagery of the media."222 In such an emotionally charged
216. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480. However, it is unclear where the high water mark is-where a court
would find a bill of attainder in the absence of a rich legislative record evidencing punitive intent.
217. See Henry, supra note 1.
218. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. But see Part V.C (discussing an interpretational
acceptance that makes it possible for Communists, who have never had a judicial trial, to be
appropriately analogized to convicted sex offenders).
219. Compare, e.g., Whitaker v. Perdue Complaint, supra note 15, at 23 (Georgia House Majority
leader Jerry Keen House statements in support of his proposed residency restriction bill: "We want
those people running away from Georgia. If it becomes too onerous and too inconvenient, they just
may want to live somewhere else. And I don't care where, as long as it's not Georgia. . . . Those are
the people we are trying to get off the streets of this state, and those are the people that we are going
to send a message to that if you have a propensity to that crime perhaps you need to move to another
state.") (emphasis added)), with 89 CONG. REc. 474, 486 (1943) (Chairman Congressman Martin
Dies comments from a 1943 speech on the floor of the House: We must "take immediate and
vigorous steps to eliminate these people from public office[;] . . . [they are] unfit to hold a
Government position." He urged the Appropriations Committee to "weigh the evidence [against the
so-called "subversives"] and take immediate steps to dismiss these people from the federal service.")
(emphasis added)). The remarks from Congressman Dies, in conjunction with other evidence that
suggested Congress intended to punish those who they felt were undesirable, was important in the
Lovett Court's decision that the act was a prohibited bill of attainder. See supra Part III.B.
220. Supra note 114; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
221. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (acknowledging that a
legislature's "responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive
legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals").
222. See Wayne A. Logan, Democratic Despotism and Constitutional Constraint: An Empirical
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environment there is political pressure on legislators to support sex offender
bills despite the constitutional questions raised; they do not want to be
viewed by their constituency as "soft," or by their colleagues or peers as
sympathetic towards sex offenders.223 Therefore, the motivational test
would likely be satisfied because such evidence reaches the concerns that
this test seeks to protect against.
C Remaining Interpretational Issues for Which History Is the Best Teacher
A finding of both specificity and punishment paves the way for
successfully challenging a legislative act as a bill of attainder, where the
legislature makes a determination-normally reserved for another branch of
government 224-that inflicts deprivation on sex offenders as a class. 2 25
However, any constitutional challenge must overcome a court's general
reluctance to declare a statute or law unconstitutional.226 The novelty of bills
of attainder as well as some gaps left in case law make this challenge
particularly demanding.227  Thankfully, our Founders wrote rich
commentaries explaining the purpose of this prohibition.228 Looking at these
commentaries can help make sure that the ends are served when applying the
Bill of Attainder Clause to modem day legislation.229
Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 439, 495 (2004);
see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 157 (2001) ("TV has changed the rules of political speech ... with its
soundbite rapidity, its emotional intensity, and its mass audience-has tended to push politicians to
be more populist, more emotive, more evidently in tune with public feelings.").
223. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
224. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S 437, 464 (1965) (White, J., dissenting) (Referring to the
majority's holding, White stated: "[The statute] is invalid as a bill of attainder because Congress has
engaged in forbidden fact-finding about individuals and groups and has thus strayed into the area
reserved to the judiciary by the Constitution."). Under our Constitution, Congress has full legislative
authority to weed dangerous persons out of places and positions where they could be harmful to
others or the country, but the task of adjudicating which individuals are to be targeted must be left to
other tribunals. Id. at 461.
225. It is not appropriate for a legislative act that affects sex offenders to be considered any less
punitive in nature simply because of the fact that the legislation is enacted with a preventative aim.
See id. at 458 ("One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from
inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment."); see also
supra note 214 and accompanying text.
226. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 462 (indicating the Court "is always reluctant to declare that an Act
of Congress violates the Constitution").
227. They are novel because up until now no court has adequately applied the bill of attainder to
sex offender regulations. See supra Part I. The gaps in case law refer in part to the fact that this
would be a case of first impression no matter where it was heard; the court's exact analysis and
answers to interpretational questions is unknown. See infra notes 230 through 234 for more on
interpretation.
228. See supra Part II.B and notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Part II.B and notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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An ambiguity exists as to the meaning of the phrase "legislative
determination without judicial trial."230 The phrase could mean the subject
of the legislation must never have had a judicial trial when the legislation
punished them, or it could mean there was no trial relative to the specific
punitive legislative act at issue. The first meaning would refer to one who
had a trial of guilt by a court, which of course would encompass all
convicted criminals. This interpretation construes the Bill of Attainder
Clause23 1 too narrowly, and leaves certain groups at the mercy of future
legislation without judicial redress.232
A possible alternative explanation is that "without the protection of a
judicial trial" means it is outside the scope of the legislatures' powers to pass
acts punitive in nature that affect a group, after their initial trial of guilt,
without a new judicial determination as to whether the act will or should
affect them. However, the policy interest of judicial economy would likely
not be served by an interpretation that would require a new judicial trial
every time the legislature wanted to create a new law that affected the rights
of certain identifiable groups.
Thus, a more probable meaning of the phrase is somewhere in between:
one that allows the Clause to function as a sieve and not an impenetrable
barrier. The Framers did not intend the Bill of Attainder Clause to allow a
legislature to stigmatize one's reputation and seriously impair one's chance
to earn a living, all outside the purview of judicial interference; 233 rather,
their intent was for it to guard against excessive and overstepping legislative
authority consistent with the Constitution's central theme to separate
powers.234 Therefore, a broader interpretation of the phrase is proper.
Beyond just restoring rights to those who have unconstitutionally had them
230. See supra Part II and note 30 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. Despite prohibition against ex post facto laws, many sex offender regulations apply
retroactively, thus leaving those affected with no remedy. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S 84, 103-04
(2003) (holding that forcing sex offenders who completed their sentences before the new law went
into effect to register their whereabouts at regular intervals, including the posting of personal
information about them on the Internet, does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws because the burden imposed serves a public safety purpose, and therefore does not
constitute punishment); see also supra note 125 and accompanying text (Congress passed the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, which imposes new registration requirements on
previously convicted sex offenders).
233. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S (4
Wall.) 277, 288 (1866) ("The constitutional prohibition [of the Bill of Attainder Clause] was
intended to protect every man's rights against that kind of legislation which seeks either to inflict a
penalty without a trial or to inflict a new penalty for an old matter.").
234. See supra Part H.B.
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taken away, the bill of attainder challenge can combat another danger
created by the poorly articulated and overly broad laws in this area.
VI. HOW THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE CAN HELP PROTECT SOCIETY
FROM A MORE ACUTE DANGER: A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY
The overwhelming myth in society is that most men who commit sexual
offenses do not know their victim. 23 5 The fact is that "90% of child victims
know their offender, with almost half of the offenders being a family
member. Of sexual assaults against people age 12 and up, approximately
eighty percent of the victims know the offender."2 36 Dr. Gene Abel, director
of the Behavioral Medicine Institute of Atlanta, a professor of clinical
psychiatry at both Emory University and Morehouse School of Medicine,
and a national expert on the treatment of sex offenders believes that
residency restrictions intended to control rogue sexual predators like Jessica
Lunsford's killer "ignore[ ] a larger public safety threat, lulling people into a
false sense of security." 237 A 2003 Minnesota Department of Corrections
Report found that "[e]nhanced safety due to proximity restrictions may be a
comfort factor for the general public, but it does not have any basis in
fact.... [Actually,] it appears that a sex offender attracted to such locations
for purposes of committing a crime is more likely to travel to another
neighborhood in order to act in secret, rather than [re-offend] in a
neighborhood where his or her picture is well known." 238 One of the causes
of the problem is that the media ignores empirical data, so its coverage of
child abductions and sex crimes predominately depicts stereotypical stranger
kidnappings, creating the appearance that this type of abduction is typical.239
This misleads parents to "overprotect there [sic] children from strangers, and
235. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS 1 (2000),
available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.pdf.
236. California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Facts About Sex
Offenders, http://meganslaw.ca.gov/facts.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
237. Henry, supra note 1. Dr. Abel explains: "only 10 percent of child molesters are
strangers .... About 30 percent of these crimes are committed by immediate family, another 30
percent by extended family and the final 30 percent by family friends and neighbors." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Therefore, he says the residency and registry restrictions do little to
address the salient dangers. Another problem as he sees it is that the laws fuel harmful
misconceptions. Id. "When we're talking about child sexual abusers, the public perception is of a
50-year-old man hanging around a schoolyard . . . . In reality, the average age for a child sexual
abuser is 14." Id
238. MINN. DEP'T OF CORRS., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT ISSUES:
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (2003) (examining "level three" re-offenders and finding no examples
that residential proximity to a park or school was a contributing factor in any of the sexual re-
offenses noted).
239. GLENN W. MUSCHERT ET AL., CHILD ABDUCTION POLICY: INFLUENCED BY MEDIA
COVERAGE OR EMPIRICAL DATA? 18-19 (Aug. 2005) available at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/
Reports/MuschertPaperRevised.pdf.
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ignore the potential for abduction by someone close to them."2 40 Then, the
public, armed with inaccurate and incomplete information, "engage[s] in
political or grassroots efforts to 'solve' the social problem, [while actually]
exclud[ing] the majority of victims." 241 It is not surprising then that many
sex offender laws do not affect recidivism rates and effectively work as a
placebo to calm the public's fear. The Bill of Attainder Clause is important
to this area of the law because it can be a tool to curb over-burdensome
legislation where many if not most of the common legal challenges have
failed, resulting in laws that do not effectuate their stated purpose 242 and
people who bear the burden of those legislative missteps with little
redress.243
A. Recommendations for the Future
Current sex offender laws,24 while ostensibly enacted with the goal to
further public safety, are neither essential nor balanced to meet that goal.245
Governments are charged with the duty to protect its citizens by taking the
necessary and appropriate steps to safeguard them from violence.246 The sex
offender regulatory scheme, and by extension our Government, will continue
to fail us until it focuses on the problem and responsibly acts to meet it.24 7
With statistics and research indicating a child is more likely to go missing
because they are abducted by a non-custodial family member than a sex
240. Id at 19; supra note 237 and accompanying text.
241. See MUSCHERT, supra note 239, at 19.
242. See, e.g., MacLean, supra note 208 (The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld residency
restrictions in Arkansas and Iowa despite them being so onerous in Iowa that "most sex offenders
were forced to live in cars, cemeteries or abandoned houses." Once the sex offenders were forced
into the streets, they stopped registering, which "prompted the Iowa County Attorneys Association
and Iowa sheriffs in 2007 to petition the legislature to repeal the law as 'counterproductive."' But,
"[tihe legislature refused." According to Corwin Ritchie, executive director of the Iowa County
Attorneys Association, "[1]egislators did such a good job of selling the idea that the restrictions on
residency was a safety measure, people have the false idea it provides safety and politicians fear
going against that . . . .").
243. See infra notes 139-162 and accompanying text. Without this challenge, once the appeals
process is complete these sex offenders are left without remedy: a proposition that the Framers did
not intend. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946).
244. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
245. See infra note 237 and accompanying text; supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
246. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14 at Ch. X (citing The European Court of Human
Rights, which held that there is duty to governments to take measures to prevent sexual violence);
see Stubbings v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1487 (1996).
247. See infra note 237 and accompanying text; supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
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predator, it should be clear that this problem needs to be addressed.248
Moreover, in the majority of cases, "abusers gain access to their victims
through deception and enticement, seldom using force. Abuse typically
occurs within a long-term, ongoing relationship between the offender and
victim and escalates over time."249 In order to truly protect this nation's
children25 0 it is important for the Government to focus its efforts where it is
needed-in the home. Government officials need to look past the
discomfort of admitting that child abuse occurs within American families
and must educate parents so they may effectively protect their children from
harm; and if abuse does occur, the Government must provide resources for
treatment in a way to encourage reporting.251
Next, the Government needs to better address the tragic, albeit less
frequent, occurrence when a violent sex offender re-offends.252 The
challenge here is not a minor one; it starts with relieving the problem of
over-crowding in prisons so that offenders who belong in jail stay there.
Then, parole boards must have the expertise and resources to carefully
screen potential parolees as another way to prevent the release of those who
exhibit signs or tendencies to re-offend. Another way to reach this issue is
to increase minimum and mandatory sentences for violent offenses. Also,
the Government must discard outdated notions that all sex offenders cannot
be rehabilitated253 and invest in cost-effective rehabilitation programs.254
Lastly, lawmakers must rely on sound research rather than sensational
media to tailor legislation to meet the true needs of society.255 Everyone
would agree that Wendy Whitaker has more than paid for her mistake and
she is not now, nor has she ever been, a danger to society; thus, she should
be taken off the registry list and the money and effort should be used to
monitor those that pose a real threat to public safety.256
248. See MUSCHERT, supra note 239 at 10-11.
249. See supra note 236.
250. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
251. Sexual assault/abuse is a "highly underreported" crime. SexOffender.com, Recidivism of
Sex Offenders, http://www.sexoffender.com/sorecidivism.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
252. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 119, 122 and accompanying text.
254. Association for Treatment of Sexual Abusers, supra note 119 (explaining that "[w]hereas
treatment of sex offenders costs about $5,000 per year, incarceration costs more than $20,000 per
year per offender"); see also Center for Sex Offender Management, http://www.csom.org (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010).
255. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 1-15.
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B. Implications for Sex Offenders
The bill of attainder challenge will have a profound impact on two main
sex offender statutes: residency257 and employment restrictions, 258 and the
lifetime registration requirement.259 First, residency and employment
restrictions would have to be considerably narrowed so the restrictions do
not result in banishment or permanent bans of certain professions, except if
they are proven to serve a legitimate regulatory purpose. 260 Dr. Levenson, a
Lynn University professor who has studied sex crime policy for almost a
decade, says that "[c]riminal offenders who have stable housing, stable
employment and support systems in their lives ... are less likely to go on
and commit new crimes."261 Secondly, the lifetime registration subjects sex
offenders to a form of punishment262 that survives constitutional challenge
because it is disguised as a regulatory scheme to protect the public, and
subsequently continues on in perpetuity.263 It is hard to see how such a
heavy burden is needed because those individuals deserving of such
punishment should remain in jail and physically removed from society. 264
Registration of a sex offender's whereabouts cannot prevent recidivism, and
researchers say it does not even deter recidivism, 265 so it is hard to see how a
lifetime registration requirement is necessary or justified. The success of the
bill of attainder challenge will give sex offenders a voice to protect
themselves from overreaching by the government in the same way as other
"non-tainted" citizens.
257. See supra notes 153-164 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
259. E.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-1-12(f)(7) (Supp. 2009) (requiring monitoring for life); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 290 (West 2009) (requiring monitoring for life).
260. See supra notes 156, 197-199 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
262. Punishment not only includes deprivation of life, liberty, or property, but also deprivation or
suspension of political or civil rights. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71. U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321
(1866); supra Part IV.
263. See supra notes 119-138 and accompanying text; see also Terry Wolf, New Sex Offender
Law Takes Effect, COURIER HERALD ONLINE Jan. 2, 2009, http://news.mywebpal.com/
newstool v2.cfm?pnplD=909&show-localnews&NewslD=942675&CategorylD=19667 (quoting
Georgia State Senator Cecil Staton; stating the belief that sex offenders rights are of little
consequence when weighed against the perceived societal benefits of the restrictions (vis-i-vis
public safety)). But see Abel, supra note 237.
264. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
If you casually observe marionettes, you may feel that they are alive.
"A marionette may accurately present the expressions and emotions of a
human being .... "2 66 However, upon closer inspection it is readily apparent
that a marionette is a lifeless thing, whose strings are being manipulated by a
26puppeteer.267 Legislators who are making and voting on sex offender
legislation are very much like marionettes; from afar they appear to be well
reasoned, acting responsibly the way we think lawmakers should act.2 68
However, upon critical review the strings are visible, and the puppeteer
chaotically orchestrating the lives of 664,731 people 269 is a misinformed and
fearful public, shaped by media sensationalism. 270
Often, legislators have been willing participants because many of them
share the feeling of contempt and disgust that is the prevailing attitude held
toward sex offenders.271 As with individuals and identifiable groups in the
past who were also the subject of disdain, had their loyalty called into
question, or their actions feared, there existed the Bill of Attainder Clause
that sought to protect against the punitive burdens created, without judicial
safeguards, by legislative enactments that were often fueled by a mob
mentality for justice.272 Similarly, although the bill of attainder challenge
has yet to be effectively utilized in the context of sex offender legislation, its
rich commentaries and case law make it clear that it is a viable challenge.273
It is important to note that violent and predatory sex offenders should be
dealt with swiftly and harshly.274 However, such consequences should be
achieved through mandatory sentencing guidelines and comprehensive,
competent parole reviews, not through overly broad legislation that fails to
266. CRIEnglish.com, The Art of Marionette Puppetry, http://english.cri.cn/4026/2008/12/03/
1261s429274.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
267. Id.
268. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
269. Sex Offender History, supra note 130 (number of registered sex offenders in the United
States and U.S Territories).
270. See supra Part IV and Part VI.
271. See supra Parts IV-V and supra note 219 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 53-82 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 30-116 and accompanying text.
274. To the victims of sex crimes, I empathize with you for the brutality and torture you have
endured. I hope this Comment does your experiences justice and you do not find my words too cold
or disrespectful. To the criminals, while this article may on its face look as though I am advocating
for your freedoms, understand that I condemn your actions and strongly support your punishment.
Nevertheless, our Constitution should guide our legislative choices, and as such when the trend of
restrictions of individual rights is going in a dangerously unconstitutional direction, there is merit in
an analysis of the consequences. This is that comment, hopefully sympathetic to the countless
victims, while discussing the constitutionality of the use of legislation to regulate the lives of
perpetrators of sex crimes.
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blic safer 7' and severely punishes many
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2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-25-sex-offender-laws-
cover x.htm (Nancy Sabin of the Jacob Wetterling Foundation, which fights child exploitation, says:
"Broad restrictions provide a 'false sense of security.' [S]uch laws do not protect the more than 90%
of abused children who suffer at the hands of people they know. And many of the laws bar
offenders from living near schools but do not stop them from loitering there. . .
276. See supra Part I notes 1-15.
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A. Communications Studies,
2004, California State University, Northridge. First, I want to thank my beautiful wife Jennifer for
her unwavering support, encouragement, love, and tolerance, without which my goals would always
seem just out of reach. I would also like to thank my parents, Gary and Andi Sherwin, for
understanding and supporting my commitment to my legal education by sacrificing their needs for
mine. Thanks to Sam, Jean, Vic, and Anngel for always being interested, asking questions, and
making me feel like I can do anything. I also wish to thank Professor James McGoldrick, who in his
own way inspired this article. I must also express my gratitude to Steve Houchin and Kaysie Fisher
for their time and help in the topic selection and editing process and the entire Law Review Staff for
all of their hard work. Finally, I dedicate this Comment to my grandparents, Harry and Berte
Sherwin, Sherman Dennis, and Esther and Mike Weisbart, all of whom would have been so proud.
1345
1346
